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ISRAEL AND EUROPE

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Michael Brenner

Preface

The *Munich Journal of Jewish History and Culture* has been published biannually since 2007. This first English edition is designed to address a broader audience beyond the German-speaking world. It contains some of the lectures presented during the first Congress of the European Association of Israel Studies, which took place in September of 2012 at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) in Munich.

The Institute of Jewish History and Culture at the University of Munich was founded in 1997. It was unique in that it was the first time Jewish history was included as part of a history department in any German university. The Institute has expanded significantly in the last fifteen years, adding positions of Hebrew and Yiddish language, medieval Jewish history, and the history of Jews in Muslim countries.

The study of modern Israel has always been an integral part of the Institute. Its faculty brings students to Israel on regular visits. In recent years, the themes of student trips have been immigration, religious and ethnic minorities, and the British Mandate. The Friends of the Institute raise and donate money to provide annual scholarships for intensive language study and immersion programs in Israel. The Institute hosts visiting professors from Israeli universities. On the faculty we are proud to have Dr. Noam Zadoff, a specialist in Israel Studies who currently holds the Ben Gurion Guest Chair of Israel Studies at the University of Heidelberg and will return to Munich this fall. I am grateful for his co-editing this issue of the *Munich Journal*.

The recently established Israel Institute has announced that LMU will be among the first universities to receive funding for a visiting professorship in Israel Studies. In the summer of 2014, Anita Shapira, Professor emerita at Tel Aviv University and author of the widely acclaimed book *Israel: A History*, will teach in Munich. We hope that this will be the first step towards establishing a permanent professorship in Israel Studies at LMU.

Noam Zadoff

Introduction

The first annual meeting of the European Association of Israel Studies (EAIS) took place at the history department of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) in Munich from 10–12 September 2012. More than one hundred scholars from sixteen countries traveled to the Bavarian capital to discuss topics related to past and present relations between Israel and Europe. Over the course of two days and over thirty sessions, they interacted in a collegial and productive atmosphere of academic exchange. The EAIS meeting in Munich was a precedent in many respects: it was the first international conference of the EAIS; it was the largest conference ever hosted at the history department of LMU; and it was probably the largest academic conference dedicated to Israel ever held in Germany.

The EAIS was inaugurated in London in the fall of 2011. It seeks to provide an academic framework for scholars at European universities who teach and research topics related to Israel and Zionism. The EAIS is politically neutral. Its aim is to create a network of scholars and to establish and support Israel Studies as an academic field in Europe. The annual meetings of the EAIS serve as a platform for exchange and collaboration between scholars and students of Israel Studies. In this respect, the interest in the Munich conference and the strong attendance suggest a promising future for the EAIS.

The LMU history department – the first history department to have fully integrated the study of Jewish history and culture – proved the perfect venue for the meeting. To a great extent, this was due to the help of the department's executive director, Dr. Wolfgang Piereth, without whom the organization of the first EAIS meeting would have been impossible.

In this special issue of *The Munich Journal of Jewish History and Culture* were presented at the EAIS conference and reflect the intellectually stimulating atmosphere of the event.

Israel and Europe: Mapping the Past, Shaping the Future

First Annual Conference of the EAIS,
10–12 September 2012,
LMU Munich



Opening panel in the Bavarian Academy of Sciences with Professor Michael Brenner, Ambassador Avi Primor, Professor Raffaele del Sarto, Professor Munter S. Dajani and former speaker of the German Parliament, Professor Rita Süßmuth.



◀ Gabor Balaz (Szeged), Colin Shindler



Amnon Aran ▲
(London), Alain
Dieckhoff (Paris),
Rory Miller
(London)

▼ Moshe Zimmermann (Jerusalem),
Michael Wolffsohn (Munich)

Elie Rekhess (Chicago), ▲
Ambassador Shimon Stein



Carol Zemel (Toronto) and
Ilan Troen (Brandeis) ▼



Alan Dieckhoff (Paris) ►

Azriel Bermant (London),
Orna Almo (London),
Samuel Ghiles-Meilhac (Paris),
Andrea Sinn (Munich) ▼



◀ Ruth Bevan (New York),
Aviva Halamish (Haifa),
Michael Brenner (Munich),
Yuval Moshkovitz (London)



▲ Concluding session

◀ Noam Zadoff (Munich), Katharina Hey (Munich)

Colin Shindler

Israel Studies in Europe

Israel Studies is not an innovation at institutions of higher education in Europe. Modern Hebrew and the study of the Holy Land reach back certainly into the nineteenth century. At my own college, the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, such academic interest began with the British Foreign Office's desire in 1916 to develop a cadre of experts which would help them understand and indeed control the Middle East. A year later Arthur Balfour wrote to Lord Rothschild whereby the British promised "a national home for the Jewish people."

The smooth governance of the British Empire required trained administrators who understood the language, history, and culture of the governed. This was true of many other countries as well where it was felt in the depths of their collective soul that imperialism was beneficial for all. From the Belgian Congo to Italian Libya, there was a need for experts to assist in the making of policy and in the training of bureaucrats. The need for speakers of modern Hebrew was no different. Thus, in one sense, the advent of the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate for Palestine, and the development of the Yishuv brought the precursor of Israel Studies to Western Europe.

Indeed the revival of Hebrew as a spoken and written language in the nineteenth century in Eastern Europe led to the development of a cultural nationalism which mirrored the emergence of the Jews as an ethnic group. After 1917, the British began to understand that the Jews were more than a marginalized religious group, more than the People of the Book. This was something new, connected with but distant from the teaching of Hebrew in departments of theology.

From the 1920s onwards, the espousal of Hebrew was later reflected in the development of courses on Hebrew literature and culture. Writers as Saul Tchernichowsky, Micha Yosef Berdyczewski, and Yosef Hayim Brenner, as well as poets such as Hayim Nahman Bialik and Uri Zvi Greenberg, became the objects of study in European institutions.

The evolution of the Jews in Eastern Europe into a national group under the influence of both the French Revolution and

the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment) gave rise to a plethora of Jewish identities, ranging from the acculturated and assimilated, on one side, to the ultra-orthodox, on the other, who painstakingly rebuilt the ghetto walls. Indeed, with the emergence of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* in the early nineteenth century, "Jewishness" came to mean more than Judaism. Instead, it could mean all aspects of the millennia of Jewish civilization, including history, culture, literature, and language, as well as religion itself. This in turn led to evaluating the Jewish question. These developments in essence gave birth to modern Jewish studies – as opposed to Judaic studies in an academic context. With the emergence of the modern Zionist movement under Herzl's aegis, the precursors of Israel Studies also began to be taught as a subset of Jewish Studies.

Despite this, Israel Studies is perceived as a comparatively new discipline in Europe. Yet it has been taught under a plethora of labels – Jewish Studies, Middle East Studies, Mediterranean Studies etc. Moreover, it has been taught in universities and institutions of higher education for decades, from Iberia to Siberia. Indeed many different aspects of Israel are taught at the universities of Tomsk, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Tyumen, Kemerovo and Altai in Siberia.

The tortuous and seemingly intractable Israel-Palestine conflict, of course, attracts a wide student audience seeking to find some rational entry into understanding the quagmire. In one sense, students desire to go beyond the slogans and sound bites which permeate and surround the Israel-Palestine conflict. There is the perception that the conflict is not simple and clear cut, but exceedingly complex. In another sense, interest in the study of Israel is also a reaction to the popularity of postcolonial theory with its Foucaultian coloring and the teachings of luminaries such as Edward Said and Noam Chomsky. Outside the classroom, the demonization of Zionism and the satanization of Israel in the public arena, have reached surrealistic levels. Students in an academic environment sense this and wish to make up their own minds on such controversial and vexed subjects, not in the sense of advocacy, but in the sense that there is another narrative which needs to be explored intellectually.

At some institutions in the UK, undergraduate students can obtain a combined degree of which Hebrew and Israel Studies



Colin Shindler at the opening of the EAIS conference in Munich, Bayerische Akademie, 10 September 2012

are merely one component. As part of such four-year programs, many students choose to spend their third year at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Master's programs in Israel Studies are also offered whereby students can select courses on language, religion, politics, history, literature, and culture, and write a thesis on a subject for which they have a passion. The Israel-Palestine conflict naturally attracts doctoral students. Recent research topics have included the Wall/Fence/Barrier; the role of the Swedes as facilitators in negotiations between the two sides; the utilization of Israeli law by Israeli Palestinians to secure their rights, and the attitude of British trade unions towards Israel.

Attitudes towards the Middle East tend to differ clearly between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe there is the legacy of colonialism. The framework of reference of the post-1945 intelligentsia was the anticolonial struggle in Vietnam, South Africa, Rhodesia, and a host of other places. It influenced myriad causes, from America's Black Panthers to, more recently, Hugo Chávez's Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela. This allowed the adherents of these movements to identify much more closely with the Palestinian cause in the 1960s, align it within a template understanding of the anticolonial struggle.

Eastern Europe has neither this burden of colonialism nor a history of subjugating the developing world. Russia confined its imperialism to its immediate neighbors. If attitudes in Eastern Europe and Russia towards Israel have been defined by the past, it is a past defined by discrimination and extermination of Jews.

Israel Studies as a stand-alone subject is therefore popular in both halves of Europe, but for different reasons.

In Germany, the inheritance of the memory of the atrocities of the twentieth century is often translated into sympathy. This transcends the ideological division of Left and Right. For example, Joschka Fischer, former foreign minister and leader of the Green Party, often demonstrated his understanding of Israel's dilemmas and choices.

Although English is the lingua franca of Israel Studies, many scholars often publish works in their own language. These publications are comparatively unknown in the English speaking world. For example, Vladimir Rumyantsev at the University of Tomsk in Siberia has published a book in Russian on Suez and its aftermath. Charles Enderlin's 1991 biography of Yitzhak Shamir, written in French, contains important interviews with

many members of the clandestine organization Lehi, which was defined by the British Mandate government as a terror group. In addition, the books of well-known scholars such as Benny Morris have been translated into French, German, Italian, Spanish etc.¹ My own "History of Modern Israel" appears to be the first such history to have been translated into Estonian.²

In Western Europe, Israel Studies is soundly established at universities in Britain, France, Germany and Italy. At the first gathering of British scholars in November 2009, approximately 40 academics attended. Since then, national networks have been established in Paris, Milan and Munich. There will be three chairs of Israel Studies in England by next summer, whereas none existed at the beginning of 2008. Heidelberg boasts the only permanent visiting chair of Israel Studies in Germany.

In Eastern Europe, there is a profound interest in Israel studies. In Poland, for example, more than 60 people from 10 Polish universities attended a talk at the University of Warsaw on the work of the European Association of Israel Studies in November 2011. In Rumania, the Research Centre for Israel Studies at the Political Sciences Department of the University of Bucharest was established in October 2012.

In Russia, the Department of Israel and Jewish Studies is an integral part of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This department, the only one in Russia, employs 15 research fellows, whose fields of interest cover such subjects as Israeli domestic and foreign policies, the Israel-Palestine conflict and more generally the Middle East. With its nine time zones, Russia is definitely unknown territory. Israel Studies is reputedly taught in 30 institutions – from the far East to Nizhni Novgorod to St. Petersburg.

At the moment, there appear to be few people in Spain, Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, and the Baltic states who teach courses dealing with Israel. Yet there is concerted interest in Hungary and Romania. Quite often the presence of a burgeoning program of Israel studies is related to the enthusiasm and determination of an individual.

¹ Benny Morris' most influential work is Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

² Colin Shindler, *A History of Modern Israel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

All this has necessitated the evolution of the European Association of Israel Studies, an organization devoted to the scholarly study of Israel. Politically neutral, it is not involved in advocacy. Its individual members, of course, have differing and often strong views on issues such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. Some prefer the solitude of academia and shy away from the public gaze. Others feel a need to fulfill the role of an *intellectual engagé* and to take part in debates and broadcasts in the public arena.

A network of Israel Studies scholars did not originate in Europe. Perhaps this was a legacy of the Shoah. It instead emerged in Israel and North America in the 1980s. The Association of Israel Studies (AIS) held gatherings of academics in the field each year alternatively in Israel and in the United States. Indeed, the 29th annual conference of the Association of Israel Studies will take place at UCLA later this year. In general, European scholars of Israel Studies were few and with little or no contact with their colleagues on the continent. Compared to the hundreds of academics that attended the annual AIS conference, the number of European scholars who participated could usually be counted on the fingers of one hand.

The European Association of Israel Studies held its first academic conference at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, in September 2012. This was attended by scholars from almost 20 countries. The expectation was the submission of about 60 proposals for presentations. Twice as many were submitted, and around 100 were selected for presentation. More than 200 people attended the opening session at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. Moreover, at Munich the vast majority of attendees were young scholars. A doctoral network was being initiated and one for post-doctoral fellows discussed.

In addition, there are European scholars in other disciplines who wish to add the teaching of Israel Studies to their list of expertise. The Summer Institute for Israel Studies at Brandeis University each year attracts academics from all over the world. The course provides a program of discussion and debate, led by leaders in the field, which provides the solid groundwork for future lecturers in this area.

So all in all, there has been a veritable explosion in Israel studies during the last couple of years alone. Moreover the story is far from over. This testifies to the reality that Israel studies is not an artificial creation which serves the megaphone war between Israel and Palestine, but is undoubtedly a genuine and fascinating area of research and discourse.

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MÜNCHNER BEITRÄGE
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Rory Miller

The Politics of Trade, Science and Technology: The Case of Israel and the European Union¹

Israel's reputation as a leading player in science and technology (S&T) is well known. So is its success in developing creative solutions to cutting-edge technological problems through innovation and entrepreneurship. Less widely known is the extent to which Israel's impressive achievements in these areas have come to influence its political relationships with other nations and blocs. This is especially true of Israel's relationship with the European Union (EU), Israel's number one trade partner and closest collaborator in civilian S&T research. The desire of EU member states to cooperate with Israel in the broader science and technology spheres has meant that even those European countries politically committed to the Palestinian cause and highly critical of Israeli policies have been keen to deepen links with Israel. This has a number of implications, both political and economic, for the bilateral EU-Israeli relationship, not least for the EU's ongoing attempt to play a constructive role in contributing to a solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Walter Hallstein, one of the European Community's founding fathers, once stated that "We are not only in business we are in politics."² Nowhere has this been more clearly seen than in the Community's involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Though generations of EU politicians have shared Joschka Fischer's belief that "Solving the Middle East and developing a real vision of peace is the major, major challenge

¹ Parts of this essay appeared previously in "The PLO Factor in Euro-Israeli Relations, 1964–1992," *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 10, No.'s 1 & 2 (Autumn–Winter, 2004), 123–155, and in "Troubled Neighbours: The European Union and Israel," in *Israel's Strategic Environment* ed. Efraim Inbar (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 29–51.

² "Hallstein Notes Political Goals of Common Market", *The Harvard Crimson*, 23 May 1961, last accessed, 21 February 2013, <http://www.the-crimson.com/article/1961/5/23/hallstein-notes-political-goals-of-common/>.



1 Cartoon published in *The Economist* magazine showing Catherine Ashton, the EU's top foreign policy official, attempting to get in between an old-fashioned gunfight between the leaders of Israel and Palestine.

for Europe,"³ up until the present time the EU has rarely been able to impose its will on the participants to the conflict or even to make a constructive contribution to the politics of peace. Indeed, successive Israeli governments have been very clear that they have no interest in Europe attempting to embark on an independent policy in order to push the peace process forward on its own.

There are, however, two interrelated areas where bilateral ties between Israel and the EU have been consistently strong, even as political relations have been strained. These are the areas of bilateral trade and research cooperation in the S&T sectors. This is not simply a consequence of market forces but is also the result of a policy embraced by Israeli governments since the late 1960s to separate their political relations with the EU from their highly valued economic relationship. It has also been a consequence of the EU's growing belief in the benefits of developing trade ties and S&T cooperation despite political differences and pressure from the Arab world.

From the time of the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, was of the view that the "closely knit community [...] would become a central force in world affairs,"⁴ and that Israel needed to forge close ties with it. Accordingly, Israel became the third country after the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to establish a diplomatic mission with full ambassadorial status in Brussels. By 1961 Israel's trade with the six founding members of the Community accounted for about 40 percent of her total exports. In 1964, despite considerable diplomatic pressure from the Arab world, the Community signed its first non-preferential trade agreement in the Middle East with Israel.

Though disappointed by the economic benefits of the 1964 agreement, Israel viewed the agreement itself positively. As

³ Ian Black, "Europe must stifle anti-semitism," *The Guardian*, 20 February 2004.

⁴ See Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process* (London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), 348.

Amiel Najjar, Israel's ambassador in Brussels, explained, the real value of the agreement was that it provided Israel with "standing" in Europe that would pave the way for more valuable links in the future.⁵ Senior Israeli figures, including Yigal Allon, Abba Eban, Shimon Peres and Levi Eshkol, all favored building on the agreement as a matter of priority. By January 1967, the Israeli delegation in Brussels was expressing its interest in a customs union in the industrial sector.

There is no doubt that the Israeli occupation, during the June 1967 war, of Palestinian territories previously controlled by Jordan (the West Bank) and Egypt (the Gaza Strip) fundamentally shifted international opinion away from Israel, eventually causing the Jewish state to lose the sympathy of European governments. In the immediate term, however, the war actually appeared to help Israel in its major objective of replacing its 1964 economic agreement (which was due to expire in June 1967) with an association agreement. As the Dutch Foreign Ministry noted, the war had created "a wave of sympathy for Israel [and] is likely to help considerably the conclusion of some form of agreement of association."⁶

On 7 June 1967 the European Commission adopted its report to the Council of Ministers containing suggestions for the new phase of negotiations between Israel and the Community. This report included a recommendation calling for the negotiation of a preferential agreement with Israel on the basis of Article 111 of the treaty. This was viewed in the press as both "politically provocative [and] a major innovation in the Community's foreign policy."⁷ However, on 27 June, though noting this proposal, the Council decided not to enter into a new round of substantive negotiations at this time of uncertainty. Instead, the original 1964 trade agreement would be extended until 30 June 1968. In December 1967, as the longer-term ramifications of the war began to coalesce, the European Council debated EEC-Israeli trade relations. The Commission restated its support for a preferential agreement with Israel which might in the future extend to association. This was supported by West Ger-

⁵ See Ambassador Sean Morrissey to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 5 December 1966, National Archives of Ireland (hereafter, NAI), 98/3/337.

⁶ Lennon, Irish Ambassador, The Hague to Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 8 June 1967, NAI, 98/3/337.

⁷ *Financial Times*, 12 June 1967.

many, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Italy, a direct competitor of Israel's in several agricultural product areas, was prepared to consider a preferential agreement, provided that the context of negotiations with Israel focused not on the Mediterranean alone, but on general enlargement. However, France, the leading European critic of Israel in the wake of the 1967 war, opposed improved economic ties with Israel on the grounds that a preferential agreement that abolished customs duties was out of proportion with Israel's economic importance to the Community. It even adopted the Italian call for expansion northwards as a way of avoiding progress with Israel.⁸

It was only in late 1969 that France agreed to withdraw its veto on an agreement with Israel, paving the way for the Israel-EEC agreement of June 1970, which extended preferential treatment to industrial commodities and granted the most significant staged-tariff reductions on Israeli industrial exports up to that point.

The entry into the Community in 1973 of the United Kingdom, Israel's third largest trading partner and an important market for Israeli agricultural produce, meant that by 1974 trade with the Community accounted for half of Israel's imports (ca. US\$2 billion) and a third of its exports (ca. US\$700 million). Not surprisingly, Yitzhak Rabin, who succeeded Golda Meir in 1974, assured the Knesset in his first speech as prime minister that "increased co-operation between us and ... the Common market in particular will now be one of the central objectives of the new government."⁹

The May 1975 EEC-Israel trade agreement, signed in 1976, was the culmination of almost three years of negotiations. It was the first agreement of its type between the Community and a non-member Mediterranean state. Foreign Minister Yigal Allon characterized it as a "great and even spectacular" opportunity for future relations with a European trading bloc that occupied "pride of place in Israel's foreign trade."¹⁰ Coming just one month prior to the first Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) meeting in Cairo, the EEC-Israel trade agreement made the Arab world furious with the Community. The Arab side argued that the agree-

⁸ Europe Agency Reports, 12 December 1967.

⁹ Address to Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin on the presentation of his government, 3 June 1974, Israel Documents, Vol. 3 (Jerusalem, 1978), 7.

¹⁰ Statement by Foreign Minister Allon to Knesset on EEC Israel Trade Agreement, 26 May 1975, Israel Documents, Vol. 2, 218.

ment was “not in accord” with past promises, that it contradicted the Community’s November 1973 Middle East declaration in support of Palestinian rights, and that it “endangered” the success of the EAD.¹¹ Though acknowledging that the timing was unfortunate, the Community rejected these Arab criticisms. It explained that the agreement with Israel was not of political, but of technical nature, simply replacing an earlier bilateral document. Moreover, it was pointed out that the agreement was balanced by the Community’s economic cooperation with the Arabs under the EAD framework.

The 1975 agreement between the EU and Israel concentrated on the development of a free trade area for industrial goods, making explicit reference to a gradual move towards this goal by 1989. This suited Israel perfectly. Mindful of the fact that GNP per capita was highest in countries where technology, chemicals, and machines made up a large percentage of exports, by the early 1970s Israel realized the prioritizing “high-tech, high skill, science based industry” would be key to long term economic success.¹² This turn to S&T especially suited Israel, with its tiny domestic market, regional isolation, lack of natural resources, and need to make long-term, risky investments in military technology in the face of relentless conflicts and arms embargos.

This decision by Israeli policymakers to focus on S&T as the only area of potential comparative advantage has brought significant rewards, contributing to the 60-fold growth of Israel’s economy between 1948 and 2010, the year that Israel’s formal classification in world financial markets was promoted from “emerging” to “developed.”

As Israel’s economy grew, so did its economic relationship with the EU. In 1981, Israel exported US\$5.6 billion to the EU (35.8 percent of its total exports). By 1992, on the eve of the Oslo peace process, Israeli exports to the Community had risen to US\$11.5 billion (35 percent of its total exports). This was an impressive achievement given that oil and arms tended to influence European purchasing decisions across the region, and that throughout this period, Israel, unlike the Arab world, had



2 This stamp, published in 1956, of Technion, Israel’s world-renowned Institute of Technology, underlines the long-standing importance of scientific and technological research in Israel society.

¹¹ See *al-Moudjahid*, 13 May 1975.

¹² Howard M. Sachar, *Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History* (New York: Knopf, 1999), 19.

no oil to sell and bought almost no weapons from the Community (there was a French embargo on the sale of military goods between 1967 and 1992 and a British embargo from 1982 to 1994). Moreover, political differences with Europe were greatly exacerbated by Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the outbreak of the first intifada in late 1987.

In response to the Lebanon invasion, the Community decided to postpone the signing of an economic agreement relating to trade credits to be provided to Israel over the next several years and also froze certain joint activities. (Greece also used its veto to halt the resumption of economic aid to Israel in the wake of the war.) In addition, following the start of the first intifada in 1987, the European Parliament postponed final ratification and approval of the trade protocols attached to the 1986 Israeli-EEC trade agreement until Israel allowed Palestinian Arab citrus growers to market their goods directly to the Community via Israeli ports without processing by Israel or a change in certificates of origin.¹³ On neither occasion was there any broad consensus within the Community regarding economic sanctions against Israel.

One important explanation as to why Israel's economic relationship with EU member states has thrived despite major political differences is that as Israel became richer over this period (between 1980 and 1995 Israeli GNP rose from US\$17 billion to US\$68 billion), it became an increasingly valuable market for the EU. By 1990, Israel was importing US\$7.5 billion worth of goods annually from the EU, making it the biggest market for EU imports in the region after Turkey, which imported goods valued at US\$9 billion. Egypt, the largest Arab market for EU imports, only purchased US\$2.5 billion worth of EU goods in the same year. More importantly, Israel's trade deficit *vis-à-vis* the EU has developed, in the words of the European Commission, into "a constant feature" of EU-Israel bilateral trade. This made the relationship highly lucrative for EU member states. By the beginning of the Oslo era the EU had a surplus of US\$5.6 billion in its balance of trade with Israel.¹⁴

¹³ Ilan Greilsammer, "The Non-Ratification of the EEC - Israeli Protocols by the European Parliament (1988)," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1991), 303-321.

¹⁴ Europa Press Release on EU-Israel relations, MEMO/95/127, 28 September 1995, last accessed 21 February 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-95-127_en.htm?locale=en.

In 1992, Israel entered into negotiations with the EU over joining the European Economic Area, a move that was consolidated following the commencement of the Oslo process in 1993. Indeed, the EU member states were clear that developing trade with Israel would be one of a number of key contributions they would make to the nascent peace process (along with funds for the Palestinian economy, the promotion of regional development, and increased purchases of goods from areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority). This commitment culminated in November 1995 with the signing of an association agreement between Israel and the EU.¹⁵

Another key, if overlapping, explanation relates to the fact that Israel is a key player in the global S&T sectors. In 1974 and 1977 Israel signed protocols with the EU under D-G-12 (the Community's Directorate for Research and Science). Since that time, bilateral S&T research and development (R&D) projects with the EU and its member states have flourished. In particular, following the start of the global high-technology boom in the early 1990s, Israel's successful domestic program of investment in R&D and funding technology incubators to nurture high-tech talent became a model for EU member states, which in turn made Israel an increasingly attractive economic partner, even as political relations deteriorated.

Following the freeze in the Oslo process after Benjamin Netanyahu's accession to the premiership in 1996, the European Commission urged member states to delay ratification of the 1995 EU-Israel association agreement unless Israel made concessions to the Palestinians. However, only France and Belgium actually delayed ratification. In the same year, Israel became the only non-EU member state invited to participate in the EU's Fourth Framework Technology Programme.¹⁶

Again, despite the fact that EU member states argued vehemently that Israel's policy of sealing off the West Bank and Gaza Strip in response to terror attacks made a "mockery of the economics of peace,"¹⁷ the evolving ties between the EU and Israel in the S&T sphere continued to develop as Europe

¹⁵ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on Israel-EU Trade Agreement, 20 November 1995, last accessed 21 February 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1995/11/Israel-EU%20Trade%20Agreement%20-%20November%201995.

¹⁶ "Science & Technology: The Way to Europe," *Ha'arets Special Report* (November 2006), 31.

¹⁷ *The Jerusalem Report*, 27 November 1997, 8.

3 Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu and the EU's José Manuel Barroso President of the European Commission at the signing ceremony of one of a number EU-Israel science and technology cooperation agreements.



looked to benefit from Israel's position (in the words of *Newsweek* magazine) as the "only serious rival" to California's silicon valley in the high-tech sphere.¹⁸

The EU's science, research, and technology frameworks are the most important EU programs for the implementation of the joint policy on science and technology. They aim to support pioneering research by junior and established researchers from EU member states and other nations invited to participate in the frameworks. In 1999, Israel joined the Community's fifth framework program. In March 2000 Israel gained "co-operating state" status in the COST research program and in June 2000 Israel was a member of the EUREKA research network. In December 2002 the EU and Israel signed a landmark agreement that enabled Israel to participate in the EU's flagship sixth framework program on scientific and technical cooperation. This came just months after Israel clashed publicly with a number of EU member states over the (false) allegation that the IDF had committed a massacre of civilians in the Palestinian town of Jenin during the most violent period of the al-Aqsa intifada.¹⁹

Though Israel's economy has problems, notably disparities in wealth, some structural weaknesses and a lack of balance between private sector independence and government intervention, it is also a highly successful example of the long-term economic benefits of robust investment and a research environment that leads to cutting-edge technological innovation

¹⁸ *Newsweek Magazine*, 8 April 1996.

¹⁹ *Jerusalem Post*, 11 April 2002; *Financial Times*, 11 April 2002. By mid-July 2003 both international aid and human rights organisations and Palestinian sources had acknowledged that the actual death toll in Jenin was 52, at least 34 of whom had been armed. See *Jerusalem Post*, 14 July 2003.

and world-class entrepreneurship. Michael Porter's diamond model predicts a nation's competitiveness through a number of important factors. One factor is a nation's capacity for creatively overcoming deficiencies and compensating through innovation.²⁰ Israel has always been very good when it comes to overcoming "deficiencies" through innovation.

This has been noted by the EU member states. Despite the fact that political relations between Israel and the EU reached an all-time low in the early 2000s, in the same period Israel was party to the most progressive trade and cooperation agreements with the EU of any non-member Mediterranean state. By 2005, cooperation between the EU and Israel in the R&D and technology sphere had (in the words of the European Commission) "increased significantly."²¹

This was even true of member states like Ireland, which has been politically hostile to Israel and openly supportive of the Palestinian cause inside the EU. During the 1970s and 1980s Ireland's economic involvement in the Middle East was dominated by trade with the oil producing, meat importing Arab and Muslim states. Between 1981 and the end of 1994, Irish exports to Israel increased six-fold (from IR£6 million to IR£40 million). When the technology boom began, this changed considerably. In the first half of 1995, Irish exports to Israel increased by 83 percent compared to the same period in the previous year.²²

From the mid-1990s, the Irish government viewed upgrading relations with Israel as a "massive contribution" to the development of its own S&T sector. In October 1999, the then Irish minister for science, technology, and commerce put it this way: "[I]t is natural that we should seek to co-operate because our two countries have much in common in terms of our geographical and population size; our dependence on exports; our evolution into modern economies with a technology led industrial base ... Ireland has deepened its relations with Israel and

²⁰ Michael Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* (New York: Free Press, 1990).

²¹ "EU-Israel Trade," Delegation of the European Union to Israel, last accessed 21 February 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/israel/eu_israel/trade_relation/index_en.htm.

²² "New Israel-EU Trade Agreement to give Boost to Ireland-Israel Trade," *Ireland-Israel Economic and Business Association Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No's 7-8 (July-August 1995), 1.

this has allowed economic relations between our two countries to grow."²³

During the same month, Ireland and Israel signed a framework co-operation agreement in industrial scientific research and technological development, through which both countries would focus on developing co-operative research partnerships under the auspices of EU-funded programs. Speaking at the time, Ireland's minister for enterprise explained the attraction that Israel's S&T prowess offered to Ireland: "Israel has achieved an international reputation for a combination of strong academic infrastructure along with prudent government support for research and development. Ireland has clearly earmarked further investment in this area as a key priority in the context of the national development plan (2000–2006) so co-operation with Israel provides an opportunity to facilitate an international aspect to the development of these objectives."²⁴

The story goes that it was during a 1999 visit to the Weizmann Institute and the Israel Science Foundation that Ireland's then science minister got the idea for the launch of the Science Foundation Ireland, which was founded in 2001. Even after the collapse of the Oslo process, as Ireland consolidated its position as one of the champions of the Palestinian cause inside the EU, the Irish media was describing Israel as the country's "most dynamic trade partner."²⁵ In the decade since, political relations have improved little, but Ireland still looks to learn lessons from Israel in the S&T sectors. In late 2012, following discussions on the issue during a visit to Israel earlier in the year, Ireland's foreign minister announced that the government would guarantee 75 percent of loans to small and medium-sized companies in order to create an indigenous S&T research culture.²⁶ This is a key part of Israel's economic strategy.

Similarly, in 1984, at a time when France and Israel were clashing politically over Israel's invasion and occupation of Le-

²³ See Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment press release, last accessed 27 October 1999, <http://www.enterprise.gov.ie>. The website has been renovated and the press release section does not go back to 1999. Instead, see "Ireland and Israel: A Tale of Two Economies," *Bank Hapoalim, Economic Report*, Issue 121, Tel Aviv, 25 October 1999.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ David McWilliams, "Big Ideas for a Small Country," *The Sunday Business Post Online*, 17 June 2001.

²⁶ *Irish Times*, 18 October 2012.

banon, French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius acknowledged that the S&T sector was a vital part of his government's economic strategy and that Israel would be a key partner in this area going forward.

There is no doubt that the thriving trade and S&T relationship has had some influence in limiting the EU's willingness to support calls for economic boycotts of, divestment from, and sanctions against Israel. In 2004, at a time that senior French politicians were developing a reputation as some of the most outspoken critics of Israeli policy, they were promoting not economic sanctions, but the establishment of a new, Paris-based joint French-Israeli high scientific authority.

But it is also true that this thriving relationship has not in any substantive way neutralized, bridged or diluted political differences between Israel and Europe. Following the signing of the Israel-EU 1975 trade agreement, then Israeli foreign minister Yigal Allon cautioned against presuming that rising trade ties would result in a change in the EU's political attitude. The prescience of this observation has become very apparent since the late 1990s. To take one example, the fact that the EU had a trade surplus with Israel of US\$6 billion in 1997 did not prevent it from adopting an outspokenly critical position on what was viewed as the Netanyahu government's anti-peace policies.²⁷

Israel cannot neutralize the EU's political hostility through trade ties and S&T cooperation, but it can take comfort in the fact that its trade and S&T ties with EU member states have proved resilient in the face of major political differences. For its part, the EU has been both unwilling and unable to leverage its unrivalled trade and S&T relationship to force Israel to make political concessions. This failure is preventing the EU from achieving its long-held goal of transforming its impressive economic power into political influence in the Middle East.

²⁷ See, for example, *Irish Times*, 28 May 1996 and 30 May 1996. See also *Irish Independent*, 31 May 1996. "EU Commitment to Middle East Peace," *Ireland 1996: Presidency of the European Union Bulletin*, No. 7 (November 1996), 2.

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Samuel Ghiles-Meilhac

European Jews Engaged in the Israeli-Arab Peace Process: A New Form of Jewish Internationalism?

Since 1948, the relationship between Jews in the diaspora and the State of Israel has been extensively documented, studied, and discussed.¹ There is a consensus among historians that the Six-Day War was a turning point in this respect. Jews from North America to Europe felt in their collective identity that the existence of Israel and the danger of its destruction had vital consequences for them.² The few weeks between May and mid-June 1967 saw the emergence of a massive phenomenon of Jewish solidarity coming from all parts of the globe with Israel. The activities of this transnational solidarity movement included transferring funds, organizing mass as well as sending volunteers and material aid to Israel. Although the majority of Jews outside of Israel had never been to the country or met any of its citizens, Jews everywhere expressed feelings of brotherhood. It became the Diaspora's moral duty to help Israel. Certain political dimensions of this solidarity movement have been the subject of numerous publications, not to mention the sharp controversies about the pro-Israel lobby and the measure of its influence on American foreign policy.³

¹ Gabriel Sheffer et al., "Roundtable on Loyalty and Criticism in the Relations between World Jewry and Israel," *Israel Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2012), 77–128.

² Eli Lederhendler, "Introduction," and Sergio Della Pergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Rosa Raicher, "The Six-Day War and Israel-Diaspora Relations: An Analysis of Quantitative Indicators," in *The Six-Day War and World Jewry* ed. Eli Lederhendler (Bethesda, Md.: University Press of Maryland, 2000), 1–9 and 11–50.

³ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). The book has provoked a considerable reaction. The debate organized by *The London Review of Books* and moderated by Anne-Marie Slaughter gives a sense of the extent of the controversy. In addition to the Messrs. Mearsheimer and Walt, panelists included Shlomo Ben-Ami, Martin Indyk, Tony Judt, Rashid Khalidi, and Dennis Ross, last accessed 20 January 2013, <http://www.scribemedialia.org/2006/10/11/israel-lobby/>.

Diaspora political support for Israel was one aspect of the internationalization of the conflict between Israel and the Arab states. Another one emerging in the 1970s was that armed Palestinian groups increasingly targeted not only Israeli institutions and individuals, but also the Jewish communities of Europe, thus exporting, as it were, the physical conflict to the Jewish diaspora. The attack on the rue Copernic synagogue in Paris in October 1980 is one among many such cases.

The political attitude of the Jewish diaspora towards Israel ranged widely from loyalty to indifference or criticism. In this essay, I explore some of these attitudes in this wide spectrum, addressing an aspect of the topic that until now has remained in shadow. Libraries are full of books and articles about politicians who have offered their diplomatic skill with a view to solving the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. From Henry Kissinger to Tony Blair, Nicolae Ceausescu to Denis Ross, Miguel Angel Moratinos to King Hassan II of Morocco, these initiatives are well known. Yet apart from Nahum Goldmann's famous project of meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in 1970 in order to start peace negotiations with Israel, diaspora Jewish peace initiatives have been widely ignored.⁴ In this paper I analyze political dialogues between European individuals and organizations who, self-identifying as Jewish, succeeded in organizing meetings with members of Palestinian organizations and leaders of Arab countries.⁵

Why did European citizens who are not diplomats engage in dialogue with political actors of the Arab Middle East? How did such dialogue affect the relationship between Israel and its neighbors? Can we analyze such initiatives as contributions to peace, as an unusual form of Jewish concern for the state of Israel, and as a way for diaspora Jews to participate in protecting Israel?

Secret and public encounters before the Oslo agreements

Starting at the end of the 1960s, various encounters between European Jews and members of the Palestine Liberation Orga-

⁴ Meir Chazan, "Goldmann's Initiative to Meet with Nasser in 1970," in *Nahum Goldmann: Statesman without a State* ed. Mark A. Raider (Albany: Suny, 2009), 297–324.

⁵ In this paper, I will not consider Jewish individuals or groups who present themselves as anti-Zionists or pro-Palestinians.

nization (PLO) took place. At first, meetings appear to have been isolated cases independent of any collective or official policy. In 1969, the French-Jewish writer Marek Halter met Yasser Arafat in Jordan and in 1972, in Lebanon⁶. According to his account, although he had been in contact with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir about the matter, he was acting only on his own behalf. The meeting remained without any political outcome.

The first time a Jewish diaspora institution was involved in direct talks with a Palestinian group was in April 1974, when the London-based newspaper *Jewish Chronicle* interviewed Said Hammami, the spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Kingdom. Hammami answered the questions of Joseph Finklestone, the paper's foreign editor. This interview marked the first time that a member of Yasser Arafat's organization publicly stated that the Palestinians would agree to a two-state solution as an interim status. It was also the first time that a member of the PLO distanced himself from Black September, the group responsible for the attack, two years earlier, on the Israeli delegation at the Munich Olympics. Although the interview had no immediate diplomatic impact, it was the first direct interaction between a Jewish institution in the diaspora and a member of the PLO. After the *Jewish Chronicle* received a significant number of letters protesting the fact that the paper had offered a platform to a member of the PLO, on 26 April 1974 it ran an editorial stating that the interview was in no way an endorsement of Hammami. However, the editorial also emphasized that the dialogue with Hammami had modified the interviewer's perception of the conflict. As the editorial stated, "Palestinians have developed a real sense of identity." This analysis was shared only by a minority both in the diaspora and in Israel.⁷

In the same period, individual European Jews acted as hosts for secret encounters between Israelis and Palestinians. In 1976, PLO member Issam Sartawi secretly met an Israeli politician, Aryeh Lova Eliav, at the home of the former French prime minister Pierre Mendès France. In Brussels at the end of the 1970s, Sartawi, Hammami, and Naïm Khader, the PLO's

⁶ Marek Halter and Eric Laurent, *Les fous de la paix. Histoire secrète d'une négociation* (Paris: Plon/Laffont, 1994), 143–145.

⁷ David Cesarani, *The Jewish Chronicle and Anglo-Jewry, 1841–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 230.



1 The 1989 "give peace a chance" meeting in Brussels in 1989. From left to right: Abba Eban, Roger Lallemand (Belgian senator), Hanna Siniora, Aryeh Lova Eliav. Behind them stands David Susskind, founder and president of the Jewish Secular Community Center.

envoy in Belgium, started to meet privately with Israelis such as Major General Mattityahu "Matti" Peled, at the home of Simone and David Susskind, the founders and directors of the Jewish Secular Community Center. Henri Curiel, a Jewish peace activist born in Egypt, was also very active as an intermediary, arranging several reunions in Europe at which the afore-mentioned Palestinians held extensive debates with Uri Avnery, a former member of the Knesset, journalist, and Israeli peace activist.⁸

Almost all of the PLO members who had secret or public meetings with Jews and Israelis in Europe and who voiced their support for a diplomatic solution were assassinated. Hammami was killed in his London office in 1978. In Portugal in April 1983, Issam Sartawi, too, was murdered.⁹

Shortly after the outbreak of the First Intifada in the occupied Palestinian territories, a group of European Jews organized a public event in support of Israeli-Palestinian peace. From 18 to 20 March 1988, the Jewish Secular Community Center in Brussels hosted a public gathering under the motto "Give peace a chance." Debates featured Palestinians such as Hannan Siniora (a publisher and journalist in East Jerusalem), Ziad Abuzayyad, Faez Abu Rachme, and Mary Khass (a Gazan educator), as well as Israeli politicians, mostly from the Labor Party, such as former foreign minister Abba Eban, Knesset members Aryeh Lova Eliav, Moshe Amirav, and Shulamit Alo-

⁸ Uri Avnery, *My Friend the Enemy* (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1987), 49–118 and 141–294.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 166, 294.

ni (of the Ratz party, officially known as the Movement for Civil Rights and Peace).

One of the first public gatherings of Israelis and Palestinians in the 1980s, the "Give peace a chance" event, made possible what seemed unthinkable in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, namely direct dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. The Belgian-Jewish organizers, it should be noted, did not claim to be neutral. Although the secular Jewish community was more critical of some aspects of Israeli policy than many other Jewish institutions, it constantly expressed its empathy and solidarity with Israel and its people. David Susskind and his wife Simone, the organizers, have explained their action as the direct consequence of their profound love for Israel. As they put it, they felt it was their duty to do everything they could to ensure Israel's future, not only by lobbying the Belgian government and encouraging cultural and economic partnerships, but also by reaching out and talking to Israel's enemies.

French Jewish Institutions and the Peace Process: An Illusion of Influence?

For many leaders of the Jewish diaspora, the handshake between Israeli prime minister Itzhak Rabin and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat in Oslo in 1993 was a historic earthquake. Just a few years earlier, they had been extremely vocal in their opposition to the Palestinian liberation movement. The Oslo peace process, leading to direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians continuing over the course of years, changed the situation dramatically.

In 1999 and 2000, initiatives by organized European Jewry led to a new stage of public diplomacy. In March 1999, in the run-up to the Israeli elections on 17 May, hotly contested by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his challenger from Labor, Ehud Barak, the Frenchman Henri Hajdenberg saw an opportunity for a surprising political move. Head of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (*Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France*, CRIF), the political umbrella organization of French Jewry, Hajdenberg decided to organize an unprecedented trip to the Middle East. This was to be no traditional solidarity mission only expressing French Jews' support for Israel. No, this time the French-Jewish delegation would visit Arab capitals and even the territories con-

trolled by the Palestinian National Authority after the Oslo Accords. Cairo was the first stop. At the Egyptian presidential palace, the French-Jewish leaders were welcomed by Hosni Mubarak and his minister of foreign affairs, Amr Moussa. The most spectacular aspect of the Egyptian stop, however, was the meeting with PLO chairman Yasser Arafat.¹⁰

At the moment of this meeting, the political context was one of complete stagnation in the peace process. The public dialogue between Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat had been on ice for weeks. In interviews given to the French press (*Le Monde*, *Libération*), Hajdenberg explained his ambitions. He believed that diaspora Jewry was now in a position to play a new role in the peace process by talking to Israel's neighbors. He went on to explain that diaspora Jews had an opportunity to exchange views with Arab leaders in a way that could help the latter better understand Israel's psychology. French Jewry, Hajdenberg insisted, was in a unique position to connect more effectively with Arab leaders because the majority of French Jews had family roots in North Africa.

After Cairo, the Franco-Jewish delegation made its way to the Gaza strip, where they held talks with members of the PA. When the delegates arrived in Israel, they were met by a closed door: Netanyahu's office regretted that a tight schedule made a meeting impossible. The CRIF delegation thus only met Ezer Weizman, the Israeli president, whose office plays a symbolic role in Israel's system of government. The CRIF delegates believed they were acting in Israel's best interests. However, there is no evidence that they defined those interests in the same way as the government of the sovereign state they were trying to help. The journey, and especially the public handshake with Arafat, provoked a fierce debate among French Jews, with numerous public figures in the community accusing the CRIF of trying to interfere in the Israeli elections.

Nonetheless, the following year Franco-Jewish diplomacy continued in the same vein.

In June 2000, leaders of the CRIF met Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Algerian president, during the latter's official visit to France. For the first time, an Algerian president met a leader of the French Jewish community. Moreover, the historical back-

¹⁰ Samuel Ghiles-Meilhac, *Le CRIF: De la Résistance juive à la tentative du lobby* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2011), 136–137.

ground was significant. More than 150,000 Jews had come to France from Algeria after it gained independence in 1962. The Hajdenberg/Bouteflika meeting came at a time when France was starting to have public debates about French colonialism and the Algerian war. One aspect of a possible reconciliation between the former colonizer and colonized was the Jewish element. In this context the Algerian authorities saw the French-Jewish leadership as a mediator both with France and with Israel. In the 1960s and 1970s, Algiers had been a center of Arab nationalism and support for the Palestinians. Declarations made by President Bouteflika indicate that he saw meeting European Jews as a first step towards engaging in a full diplomatic process with Israel. Already in July 1999, Bouteflika had broken a taboo when he shook Ehud Barak's hand at the funeral of King Hussein of Jordan. After talking with Hajdenberg in 2000, Bouteflika said that Algeria was ready, following the creation of a Palestinian state, to establish a "special relationship" with the Jewish state.¹¹

Fragility and Dependence of Non-State Actors

Legally, these European Jews were outsiders to the state of Israel. Politically, their limited influence as transnational actors, especially compared to their American counterparts, kept them outside the policy-making process of the Israeli government. Their public actions had no direct effect on official diplomacy and defense. But their outsider status did not prevent the encounters from taking place and appearing to grant diaspora Jews a status of emissaries of Israel in the peace process. In times of heated conflict, however, the initiators of such symbolically meaningful public gestures found themselves powerless. Hajdenberg has stated that he went, in coordination with the French diplomatic authorities, to the Gaza strip in the summer 2000 to meet Arafat after the failed Camp David summit. But he understood that, when it came to key diplomatic issues, he had no influence on the *raïs*.¹²

After the outbreak of the Second Intifada in the fall of 2000, European Jews could only witness, mourn, and denounce the circle of violence between Israel and the Palestinians.

¹¹ Ibid, 141–145.

¹² Interview with the author, Paris, 11 September 2007.

The non-state diplomatic overtures by diaspora Jews to public Arab figures can be considered a contemporary form of the Jewish internationalism which had its heyday in the nineteenth century. In 1840, Jewish leaders such as Adolphe Crémieux, from France, and Sir Moses Montefiore, from England, undertook public initiatives on behalf of the persecuted Jews of Damascus.¹³ Such advocacy was among the key goals of the *Alliance israelite universelle*, founded in 1860 in Paris, and of the American Jewish Committee, established in New York in 1906. Both organizations engaged in diplomatic actions to protect and aid coreligionists in parts of the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia.

The latter-day non-state Jewish diplomacy I have discussed here also highlights a pattern observable in historical Jewish political leadership: the vertical relationship to power. In seeking dialogue with Arab political authorities (who in most cases were not chosen in free elections), Diaspora leaders such as Hajdenberg were walking in the footsteps of the Jewish tradition of seeking royal alliances assuring protection of Jewish communities in exchange for loyalty.¹⁴ The CRIF sought not to establish a dialogue with members of Palestinian or Arab society, but to influence heads of state. It will be fascinating to explore in the coming years the consequences that the Arab revolutions since 2011 are having for Jewish diplomacy. Rather than focusing exclusively on political leaders, diaspora leaders may now be inclined to enter into dialogue with the intellectuals, journalists, and political parties emerging in these societies.

At the same time, however, European Jews may also find themselves in a situation where they are used by national diplomacy as symbolic tools. After the death of Arafat in 2004 and the restart of some political negotiations between Israel



2 Handshake between Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and CRIF president Richard Prasquier, 27 September 2010, in Paris.

¹³ Lisa Moses Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity: The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in Nineteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 120–126.

¹⁴ Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Servants of Kings and Not Servants of Servants: Some Aspects of the Political History of the Jews* (Atlanta: Tam Institute for Jewish Studies, Emory University, 2005).

and the Palestinian National Authority, meetings between European Jews and Palestinian leaders resumed. In autumn 2010, while visiting Paris, President Mahmoud Abbas met with CRIF president Richard Prasquier and with local Jewish figures such as René Samuel Sirat, former Chief Rabbi of France. French president Nicolas Sarkozy declared during a press conference that this meeting had been organized at his suggestion.¹⁵ Because of their need to maintain good relations with their national political leaders, European Jews may thus be co-opted by state public diplomacy, only enjoying very limited autonomy. Moreover, Jews find themselves in a difficult position when the interests of the home state diverge from Israel's interests. In January 2012, the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* reported that a meeting between Abbas and British-Jewish leaders had been scheduled on the initiative of 10 Downing Street, but had been canceled by the request of the Israeli embassy.¹⁶

The conflictual implications of the triangular relationship between a diaspora, the host country, and the homeland remain a central dilemma for Jewish communities seeking to reconcile their views on the Israeli-Arab conflict with the interests of the Jewish state and those of their home country.¹⁷

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- 1 Centre communautaire laïc juif de Bruxelles.
- 2 Alain Azria CRIF.

¹⁵ The transcript of the press conference with Nicolas Sarkozy and Mahmoud Abbas in Paris on 27 September 2010 is available, in French, last accessed 20 January 2013, <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/107002056.html>.

¹⁶ Barak Ravid, "British Jews cancel meeting with Abbas in wake of pressure from Netanyahu," *Haaretz*, 23 January 2012.

¹⁷ On the notion of a triangular relationship, see Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics. At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 192–199.

Azriel Bermant

Britain's Policy towards Israel under Margaret Thatcher

This article explores an aspect of Anglo-Israeli relations that has been surprisingly neglected: Britain's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict under the Thatcher Government. Margaret Thatcher, Britain's prime minister between May 1979 and November 1990, was a strong believer in the urgency of a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based upon territorial compromise. This is an interesting notion, since the British leader was known for her dislike of compromise, as she herself makes clear in her memoirs:

"There are very few international questions in which compromise is more necessary or more difficult than in the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel/Palestine. Throughout my political life I have usually sought to avoid compromise, because it more often than not turns out to involve an abdication of principle. In international affairs, it is often also symptomatic of muddle and weakness. But over the years I have been forced to conclude that the Arab-Israeli conflict is an exception."¹

Thatcher did not necessarily take this position out of sympathy with Palestinian grievances (there is a view that she was not particularly sympathetic towards the Palestinians).² Rather, this article maintains that she was strongly influenced by cold war considerations in her approach towards the Middle East. Thatcher was worried that failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict would heighten instability in the Middle East, threatening Britain's moderate Arab allies. In particular, there was concern that the Soviet Union would exploit this instability to expand its influence in the Middle East at the expense of Western interests. Thatcher had initially viewed Israel as a bulwark against the danger of an expanded Soviet presence in the Middle East. Indeed, her early support for Israel may have been linked to her view of the country as a strategic asset against

¹ Margaret Thatcher, *Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 243.

² Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (London: Pan Books, 1995), 477.

the Communist threat.³ Nevertheless, over time, Thatcher increasingly viewed Israeli policies as a liability rather than an asset for Western interests.

There is a view that Thatcher's Finchley constituency (which she represented in Parliament), with its relatively large Jewish population, significantly influenced her position on Israel.⁴ Thatcher was exposed to pressure from supporters of Israel within her constituency. There is some evidence to suggest, for example, that she was uncomfortable about talking to the PLO, partly as a result of pressure from the Israelis and the Jewish community in Britain.⁵ However, Thatcher's Finchley constituency had only a very marginal impact on her policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict.

To date, the historiography on the Thatcher era has understandably placed an emphasis on the strong relationship between Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. For example, Hugo Young described the Reagan-Thatcher relationship as "the most enduring personal alliance in the Western world throughout the 1980s."⁶ Yet there were serious differences between the two leaders over Middle East policy, and these only became stronger over time. Thatcher became increasingly exasperated with Reagan over his reluctance to take active measures to advance negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The main source of Thatcher's frustration with Washington was over the difference in approach towards the moderate forces of the Middle East.

British policy in the early 1980s was formulated in the context of recent events. In 1979, the year in which Thatcher became prime minister, East-West détente had broken down. The Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution had taken place in Iran. The need to prevent political instability and Soviet expansion in the region had become a matter of great urgency. Thatcher's Middle East policy was dictated largely by concerns over threats to the stability of the moderate Arab states. The Conservative government of the

³ TNA (The National Archives, Kew, London)/FCO 93/2055, Letter from B. Cartledge to JS Wall, 15 August 1979.

⁴ Mark Stuart and Douglas Hurd, *The Public Servant* (London: Mainstream, 1998), 119.

⁵ FCO/FOI (Freedom of Information), Memorandum of Meeting between M. Thatcher and King Hussein, 8 April 1981.

⁶ Hugo Young, *One of Us* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 249.

time was unhappy with the Likud Party under the leadership of Menachem Begin, viewing its inflexible policies as having negative ramifications for the stability of the region. As a result, Thatcher largely agreed with the Foreign Office (FCO) that a policy shift on the Palestinian question was necessary to put an end to the situation in which the Soviet Union was an advocate for the Palestinians against an American-backed Israel.⁷

During a meeting in January 1980, King Hussein of Jordan warned Thatcher that the Soviets were moving towards the oil producing regions. Thatcher asked the king whether this was the reason behind the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He replied that it was. Britain's foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, added that the Soviets had established a centre from which they could operate throughout the region. Hussein described it as a wedge dividing the Muslim world in half. The king added that the dangers of subversion had to be brought home to countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States. He warned that the Saudis were "ripe for plucking" by the Soviets.⁸

As mentioned before, one of the cornerstones of postwar British policy in the Middle East was the establishment of regional stability through building strategic alliances with moderate Arab regimes. Stability was essential for Britain in order to protect its political and economic interests in the region. A cautious approach was taken towards Israel, exemplified by restrictions on arms sales to the Jewish State, as a means to maintaining Arab support for Britain. In view of concerns regarding the growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East, officials in London also believed that urgent measures had to be taken to ensure that Arab states would remain within the Western orbit.⁹ The Thatcher government followed this line of thinking.



1 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with Jordan's King Hussein at 10 Downing Street.

⁷ The Margaret Thatcher Foundation (MTF), Written Interview for Yehudit Ahronoth, 20 November 1987.

⁸ FCO/FOI, Memorandum of Meeting between M. Thatcher and King Hussein, 24 January 1980.

⁹ For example, see Evelyn E. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1986); Azriel Bermant, *A Triumph of Pragma-*

At first, Thatcher was opposed to a British move to support Palestinian self-determination which was being formulated by Carrington.¹⁰ However, Thatcher's personal experience of Menachem Begin's strong ideological stand over a Greater Israel was a significant factor which highlighted the constraints she faced in Middle East policy. This was made abundantly clear within weeks of her coming to office. During a difficult meeting with the Israeli prime minister in May 1979, Thatcher expressed her concern over his attitude towards a comprehensive peace settlement with the Palestinians. Begin's insistence on Israel's right to build settlements in the West Bank was deeply troubling for both Thatcher and Carrington. Begin had only recently signed a peace accord with Egypt's president, Anwar Sadat. However, Thatcher was anxious that Sadat's position would come under serious threat if the peace process collapsed. She warned Begin that the Soviets would take advantage of any difficulties in the Middle East in order to strengthen their position in the region.¹¹ Thatcher was increasingly concerned that the inflexible policies of Israel's Likud government were bringing instability to the Middle East and threatening Britain's moderate Arab allies, exposing them to Soviet influence. Thus, Thatcher's firm anticommunist orientation actually resulted in the adoption of an increasingly critical position towards Israel's government. During a meeting with French president Giscard D'Estaing a few months later, Thatcher agreed entirely with her French counterpart that Begin's approach had been "fanatical and unrealistic."¹²

Thatcher's growing support for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was in line with her strategic view of the possible threats to Western interests in the Middle East. Thus, during a meeting with UN secretary general Kurt Waldheim in 1979, the prime minister stated that threats to oil supplies could only be resolved through a resolution of the "political problems of the Middle East." She added that the "West was at present witnessing the creation by the Soviet Union of a belt

tism over Principle: Margaret Thatcher and the Arab-Israel Conflict (PhD diss, University College London, 2012).

¹⁰ TNA/FCO 93/2061, Letter from M. Alexander to G. Walden, 14 September 1979.

¹¹ TNA/FCO 93/1683, Meeting between M. Thatcher and M. Begin at 10 Downing Street, 23 May 1979.

¹² TNA/FCO 93/2061, Discussion between M. Thatcher and President Giscard, 21 November 1979.

of instability across Africa and Asia." Thatcher maintained that a settlement which would enhance stability in the region "would be a great prize."¹³

By the beginning of 1980, it was emerging that Cold War calculations were a dominant factor in Thatcher's policy shift on the Israeli-Palestinian question. Thus, in January 1980, she wrote to US president Jimmy Carter to express her anxiety over Soviet intentions following the invasion of Afghanistan. She asserted that while the West had sought to lower the risk of war with the Soviet Union through arms reductions and human contacts, the Russians had "continued to pursue a policy of expansion and subversion wherever they felt they could get away with it." In countering the Soviet Union, Thatcher argued for providing encouragement to Muslim countries to denounce the Russian action in Afghanistan and called for the acceleration of negotiations over the sale of British arms to Oman, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. In particular, she drew Carter's attention to the view of the Saudis and other Arab countries that "the whole Western position in the area was undermined by the Arab/Israel conflict and the failure to solve the Palestinian problem."¹⁴

Thus, Thatcher endorsed the British policy shift on the Palestinian question contained within the EEC Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980, which called for an end to Israel's "territorial occupation" and expressed support for Palestinian self-determination and the PLO's association with peace negotiations. The British prime minister was moving towards a more pragmatic position on the PLO. The Begin government fiercely opposed the initiative. Begin wrote to Thatcher in great anguish, asserting that the initiative was deeply hurtful to his country and "impossible to accept."¹⁵

While Thatcher enjoyed a close relationship with Reagan, Carter's successor, she became increasingly disillusioned with Washington's attitude on the Arab-Israeli question. As a result of the heightened Cold War atmosphere, Thatcher feared that the Soviet Union would exploit Arab dissatisfaction over Washington's attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was

¹³ TNA/PREM 19/108, Memorandum of M. Thatcher's Discussion with K. Waldheim, 12 July 1979.

¹⁴ MTF, Letter from M. Thatcher to J. Carter, 26 January 1980.

¹⁵ ISA (Israel State Archive) 7308/5, Letter from M. Begin to M. Thatcher, 17 June 1980.

a factor in her strong encouragement for the American AWACS airborne radar system deal with Saudi Arabia. The Reagan administration sought to utilize the AWACS deal as an opportunity to promote a strategic dialogue with moderate Arab states. During a visit to Washington in September 1981, Begin expressed his opposition to the AWACS sale in the strongest terms, describing it as a grave threat to Israel's security. However, Thatcher had warned the US president that the Arabs had lost faith in the Americans, since, according to them, the West neglected the Palestinians and was one-sidedly committed to Israel. She added that a failure to seal the AWACS deal would result in considerable damage to relations between America and the Arab world.¹⁶ Thatcher's fierce condemnation of Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 was also influenced by the fact that Iraq had gradually been moving away from the Soviets and seeking closer ties with the West.¹⁷

By the mid 1980s, Britain's heightened concern over a regional stalemate resulted in Thatcher's direct intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. King Hussein and Shimon Peres were at the centre of Thatcher's diplomatic efforts. She believed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could best be resolved within the framework of a confederation between the West Bank and Jordan rather than by means of an independent Palestinian state.¹⁸ Thatcher shared the FCO goal of strengthening the position of Labor leader Peres, who served as Israel's prime minister between 1984 and 1986 in a national unity government with Likud's leader Yitzhak Shamir. Throughout the years of the national unity government, Peres sought an agreement with Hussein in order to restore the heavily populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordanian rule, while leaving the strategically important areas under Israeli control.

Thatcher was aware that she would have to act quickly to help Peres, since the national unity coalition arrangement required him to step down as prime minister in October 1986, with Shamir replacing him. Thatcher believed that Shamir

¹⁶ MTF, Thatcher Letter to Reagan (Impressions of Arab Opinion), 1 October 1981.

¹⁷ FCO/FOI, Memorandum of Meeting between M. Thatcher and King Hussein, 8 April 1981.

¹⁸ FCO/FOI 698-09, Cable from Head of NENAD to Heads of Missions: Prime Minister's Meeting with Shamir, 23 May 1989.

was a hardliner incapable of demonstrating the flexibility necessary for obtaining a peace settlement. During Shamir's visit to London as Israel's foreign minister in June 1985, Thatcher had berated him over his refusal to compromise on the Palestinian question.¹⁹ She feared that the status quo in the Arab-Israeli arena would be perpetuated if the Likud leader were in charge of Israeli policy, with dangerous consequences for the region. Thatcher's determination to support Peres was expressed through her historic visit to Israel in May 1986, while he was still prime minister. She became the first British leader to visit the Jewish State while in office. Thatcher would not have done so if Shamir had been prime minister.²⁰

It was very clear to Thatcher that any peace settlement in the Middle East would require active American intervention. In her opinion, the United States was the only power that could apply pressure on Israel.²¹ However, Reagan was unwilling to challenge Shamir or provide backing to Hussein or Peres. This would become a major point of contention between Thatcher and the Reagan administration. It was the issue of an international peace conference which perhaps produced the strongest differences between London and Washington on the Middle East. King Hussein sought to convene a conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with a view to launching peace negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Thatcher had initially been skeptical about the idea of a peace conference since she feared that it would enable the Soviets to "play a wrecking role".²²



2 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

¹⁹ FCO/FOI 698-09, Letter from CD Powell to P. Ricketts, 4 June 1985.

²⁰ Interview of the author with Yossi Ben Aharon, adviser to Yitzhak Shamir and director general of the Israeli prime minister's office from 1986 to 1992, 6 April 2010.

²¹ FCO/FOI, Memorandum of Meeting between M. Thatcher and King Hussein, 28 May 1980.

²² FCO/FOI 0896-11, Cable from C. Pigott, NENAD, to AJ Coles, Amman, 18 June 1985.

However, Thatcher soon became convinced that an international conference was the only way to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East. In April 1987, Hussein met secretly in London with Peres (now Foreign Minister in Israel's coalition government) where an agreement was reached on an international conference to launch a process of negotiations. Thatcher's own private office was involved in organizing the secret Peres-Hussein meeting.²³ In the months that followed, Thatcher worked actively to persuade the Reagan administration to support the Hussein-Peres understanding (also known as the London Agreement). However, the Americans refused to support the London Agreement because Shamir was fiercely opposed to the idea of an international conference. The Reagan administration was deeply reluctant to become entangled in Israel's internal politics. This was made clear to Thatcher during her meeting in July 1987 with US secretary of state George Shultz. The US secretary told Thatcher that there was no point in promoting a new initiative without Likud support: the American approach was to seek Shamir's approval. Shultz expressed his unease over Thatcher's approach, which appeared to back Peres against Shamir in a domestic Israeli partisan showdown. Shultz suspected that Peres would lose such a contest.²⁴

In September 1987, Thatcher met with King Hussein and reported on her recent visit to Washington. She stated that the absence of progress on the Arab-Israeli issue was "depressing." Thatcher warned the Americans against giving Shamir the power to veto an international conference. She believed that the hesitancy shown by the Americans was enabling the Soviets to consolidate their position in the Middle East. Indeed, Hussein had told the British prime minister that the Russians would be able to supply him with MIG-29 jet fighters by the end of 1987.²⁵ Thatcher warned the Americans that such a deal would endanger Western defense cooperation with Jordan, and would be highly damaging for Western interests in the region. Thatcher pointed out to Reagan that there was a risk of "losing the initiative" and being outflanked by the Soviets in

²³ Interview with Lord Powell, 18 November 2008.

²⁴ Reagan Library, Ledsky/92082/61795, Meeting between Prime Minister Thatcher and Secretary Shultz, 17 July 1987.

²⁵ FCO/FOI 0896-11, Letter from CD Powell to R. Culshaw, 11 September 1987.

the Middle East unless a strong diplomatic effort was made to promote the peace process in the Arab-Israeli arena.²⁶

Reagan responded that while the United States was not abandoning the idea of a conference, certain realities had to be faced. Shamir was in a strong position and could not be ignored. The United States remained interested in the possibility of a conference, and Shamir was aware of this. However, it made little sense to go to a conference if immediate deadlock was likely. Reagan supported quiet efforts to develop understandings with the parties on the nature of the negotiations. Reagan wrote that the United States would maintain a dialogue with the Soviets and would continue its efforts to launch negotiations. He promised to keep Thatcher updated, and expressed appreciation for her assessment.²⁷

However, Thatcher was uncomfortable enough with Washington's position on the Middle East to express the view that Britain and Europe had to show some independence on policy. For example, as early as 1981, in the context of differences with the United States over the European contribution to the Multinational Force in Sinai as part of the Camp David Accords, Thatcher had said to King Hussein that "while the fate of the West depended, of course, on the United States, ... this did not mean that the Europeans had to follow the Americans slavishly."²⁸ In an interview some years later in the Israeli newspaper *Yediot Ahronoth*, Thatcher warned that Israel's policies were having a negative impact on the geopolitics of the region: according to her it was very problematic that the United States was being perceived as "Israel's lawyer," while the Soviet Union was viewed "as the friend of the Arabs." Thatcher argued for Britain and Europe to play a role as "a third party" which was "not bound by US or Soviet policies."²⁹ By the end of 1987, Thatcher's concern over the growth of Soviet influence continued to be a key consideration in her Middle East policy. She appeared to be distancing herself publicly from the Reagan policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian question.

²⁶ Reagan Library, Declassified, Executive Secretariat, NSC: System File, Box 230, 8790998–8791003, Doc 88420, Message from M. Thatcher to R. Reagan, September 1987.

²⁷ MTF, Reagan Letter to Thatcher, 30 September 1987.

²⁸ FCO/FOI, Memorandum of Meeting between M. Thatcher and King Hussein, 17 November 1981.

²⁹ MTF, Written Interview for *Yediot Ahronoth*, 20 November 1987.

The Thatcher government and the Reagan administration were working at cross purposes on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Reagan and Shultz were effectively consolidating the position of Shamir and weakening Peres by withholding support for an international conference. In contrast, Thatcher was attempting to strengthen Peres at the expense of Shamir and his Likud party by supporting an international conference and trying to persuade the Americans to do so. However, this policy was unsuccessful since King Hussein would ultimately cut his links to the West Bank in July 1988 in the wake of the Palestinian Intifada, with the more radical PLO becoming the new address for negotiations with the Palestinian side. Peres was also significantly weakened as a political leader, faring badly in the Israeli election of November 1988.

Conclusion

The perceived threat from the Soviet Union was a highly significant issue that drove Thatcher's thinking on Middle East issues. While she was a great admirer of President Mikhail Gorbachev, she retained her suspicions of Soviet foreign policy.³⁰ During her early months in power, Thatcher viewed Israel as a strategic asset which could help to contain Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. Reagan shared this perspective.³¹ The difference was that the US president continued to view Israel as a strategic asset throughout his time in office and was reluctant to challenge Israel's policies. In contrast, it was becoming increasingly clear to Thatcher that the inflexibility of the Likud-led Israeli government was a liability which was helping to boost Soviet influence in the region at the expense of the West. On this point, there were strong differences between the Thatcher Government and the Reagan Administration. Reagan and Shultz were unwilling to support Peres, largely as they believed that this would be interpreted as taking sides in Israel's domestic politics. Arguably, concern about a backlash from Likud supporters in Washington also made the American side reluctant to provide open support for Peres. The British government was not subject to the same domestic con-

³⁰ John Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher – Volume Two: The Iron Lady* (London: Vintage Books, 2008), 298–299.

³¹ Helena Cobban, "The US-Israeli Relationship in the Reagan Era," *Conflict Quarterly* (Spring 1989), 5–32.

straints. It is noteworthy that Thatcher was unhappy with the perceived role of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington and the negative impact it appeared to have on US policy towards the Middle East.³² Thatcher did everything in her power to help both Peres and Jordan's King Hussein. Nevertheless, she was a realist who realized that her efforts to help regional moderates would have little success if Washington was not prepared to exert its influence in the region.³³

PHOTO CREDITS

1 <http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/british-prime-minister-margaret-thatcher-with-king-hussein-news-photo/2628489>

2 <http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/israeli-prime-minister-shimon-peres-with-british-prime-news-photo/50388258>

³² Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher*, 338.

³³ FCO/FOI, Memorandum of Meeting between M. Thatcher and King Hussein, 28 May 1980. Also, Thatcher, *Statecraft*, 246.

Oren Osterer

Anatomy of a Non-Relationship: Israel and the German Democratic Republic

The State of Israel and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) never established diplomatic relations. Although prospects for relations seemed promising, divergent ideological and political interests led to antagonism. By the mid-1950s, larger Cold War alignments as well as specific East German developments made mutual recognition impossible.

The Soviet Union and Israel

Diplomatically, the Soviet Union was one of the initial supporters of the establishment of a Jewish state.¹ On 14 May 1947, Moscow's leading UN-delegate and deputy foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, stated that "it would be unjust [...] to deny the right of the Jewish people particularly in view of all it has undergone during the Second World War."² However, because Moscow's prime interest in the Middle East was weakening British and Western influence,³ the Soviets viewed withdrawal of British forces as the "first and essential condition"⁴ for any kind of independence in Palestine. Although the Soviets would initially have preferred the creation of a bi-national Arab-Jewish state, they were prepared to accept a two-state solution in the event that friction between Jews and Arabs continued unabated. By October 1947, after months of continued violence in

¹ In comparison, the USA, in February, 1948, retreated from its initial support for a Jewish state and suggested an international trusteeship for all of Palestine. Michael J. Cohen, *Palestine and the great powers, 1945–1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 345–366.

² "A.A. Gromyko's speech at the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly, 14 May 1947," in *Documents on Israeli-Soviet relations, 1941–1953*, ed. Eytan Bentsur. (London: Cass, 2000), 189–196.

³ For further motives see Arnold Krammer, "Soviet Motives in the Partition of Palestine, 1947–48," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 2, no. 2 (1973), 102–119.

⁴ "B.E. Shtein to A. I.a. Vyshinskii, 6 March 1947," in *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 169–172.

Palestine, the Kremlin spoke out in favor of the creation of an independent Jewish state.⁵

Moshe Shertok (later Sharett), head of the Zionist UN-delegation and Israel's first foreign minister, viewed the Soviets "not just as our allies, but as our emissaries."⁶ No less important than Soviet diplomatic support, however, was the supply of desperately needed arms in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948/49 by Czechoslovakia, which continued until 1951.⁷

Home to the world's largest Jewish communities, the USSR and the USA were the main potential sources of Jewish immigration to Israel. Thus, for as long as possible, Israel tried to maintain a policy of *non-alignment* with either of the Cold War blocs.⁸ By the end of 1949, however, circles within Moscow's Foreign Ministry were convinced that Israel's policy was only "disguised as 'neutrality,'" and that it had adopted "a hostile, if at present restrained, attitude to the USSR."⁹ Indeed, once admitted to the UN, Israel gradually sided with the Americans. Yet the USSR never offered Israel any incentive for following a different course. Soviet Jews were not permitted to emigrate to Israel, and emigration from the Socialist countries in Eastern Europe was gradually restricted.

In October 1952, the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv assessed that Israel had "chosen a course which is incompatible with normal diplomatic relations,"¹⁰ and accused the Israeli government of instigating a countrywide anti-Soviet campaign.¹¹ Indeed, the Slánský Trial in Prague of November 1952, in which eight Jews were sentenced to death for alleged collaboration with the Gestapo and Zionist organizations, gave Jerusalem

⁵ See Seymon Tsarapkin's speech of 13 October 1947, printed in Yaacov Ro'i, *From Encroachment to Involvement. A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East* (New York: Wiley, 1974), 48–51. See also "V.M. Molotov to A. Ia. Vyshinskii, 30 September 1947," in *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 227.

⁶ "Excerpts from M. Shertok's Report to the Provisional Government of Israel, 26 October 1948," in *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 389–392.

⁷ Uri Bialer, "The Czech-Israeli Arms Deal Revisited," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 8, no. 3 (1985), 307–315.

⁸ Uri Bialer, *Between East and West. Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948–1956* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁹ "I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko, 29 September 1949," in *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 534–539.

¹⁰ "A.N. Abramov to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 October 1952," in *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 840.

¹¹ "Excerpts from the Political Report of the USSR Legation in Israel, 31 January 1953," in *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 868–870.

reason to be concerned about the safety of Jews in Communist countries.¹² The Kremlin's Doctor's Purge of January 1953, in which Jewish physicians were accused of deliberately shortening the lives of Communist leaders at the behest of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, only added insult to injury.¹³

On 9 February 1953, a bomb exploded on the grounds of the Soviet embassy in Tel-Aviv. Despite Israeli apologies and promises to hunt down the perpetrators, the Kremlin protested that the "terrorist act [...] demonstrates the absence of the most basic conditions for normal diplomatic activity,"¹⁴ and broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. Although diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel were revived some months later, the relationship remained sour. In 1955, Moscow and Cairo signed a comprehensive arms deal granting substantial military support to one of Israel's biggest enemies. The brief honeymoon between Israel and the USSR was over.

Discussions about Indemnification

The failed relationship between Israel and the USSR alone cannot explain the fierce antagonism between Israel and the GDR. The other Socialist countries of Eastern Europe maintained full diplomatic relations with Israel at least up until the Six Day War in 1967. Rather, it was the question of indemnification for the Nazi genocide that proved a main obstacle in relations between the GDR and Israel. The GDR's ruling party, the SED (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*), did not recognize Jews as a unique victim group of Nazism and was unwilling to pay compensation to the State of Israel.

Initially, however, some early signs hinted at East German readiness to find a solution. Most notably, in April 1948, Otto Grotewohl, co-chairman of the SED, privately floated the idea of paying collective compensation to a (future) Jewish state.¹⁵

¹² Peter Brod, *Die Antizionismus- und Israelpolitik der UdSSR. Voraussetzungen und Entwicklungen bis 1956* (Baden-Baden: Nomos), 88–91.

¹³ Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, *Stalin's Last Crime. The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948–1953* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003).

¹⁴ "Note from the USSR Government to the Israeli Legation in Moscow, 11 February 1953," in *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 883.

¹⁵ Angelika Timm, "Der Streit um Restitution und Wiedergutmachung in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands," *Babylon* 10–11 (1992), 128.

In retrospect, it is highly doubtful that Grotewohl's idea reflected an official position. On 5 October 1949, the Victims-of-Nazism Decree, prohibiting restitution of "arianized" private property and compensation to people living abroad, was passed for the Soviet Occupied Zone. Two days later, with the founding of the GDR, the decree was adopted law.¹⁶ Israel, however, continued to seek a negotiated settlement with the GDR until 1956.

In early 1951, Israel involved the West and the Soviet Union in the issue,¹⁷ attaining in September 1952 the Luxembourg Agreement, by which West Germany and Israel settled on 1.5 billion D-Mark as compensation,¹⁸ of which one third was to be paid by the GDR.¹⁹ But Israel and the GDR were caught in a deadlock situation: Israel was unwilling to recognize the GDR until the matter of indemnification was resolved, and the GDR refused to pay indemnification until it was recognized by Israel.²⁰ Further meetings, mainly in Moscow, clarified East Berlin's ultimate line of argument: Because Israel was founded only after the Nazi crimes had been committed, it could not be entitled to compensation for those crimes. Moreover, the GDR was unwilling to support a state that served the interests of international capitalism. The documents of the Foreign Ministry in East Berlin lack any reference to contacts with Israel between 1956 and 1971.²¹

The question of East German indemnification remained unresolved until the reunification of Germany. When, in November 1989, Erich Honecker resigned from all his political functions in the SED, the new government under Hans Modrow

¹⁶ Ralf Kessler, "Interne Wiedergutmachungsdebatten im Osten Deutschlands – die Geschichte eines Mißerfolgs," in *Arisierung und Restitution. Die Rückerstattung jüdischen Eigentums in Deutschland und Österreich nach 1945 und 1989*, ed. Constantin Goschler and Jürgen Lillteicher (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 197–213.

¹⁷ See Rolf Vogel, ed., *Der deutsch-israelische Dialog. Dokumentation eines erregenden Kapitels deutscher Außenpolitik, vol. 1* (Munich: Saur, 1987), 33–39.

¹⁸ Which amounted to a little less than half of the initially claimed 1.5 billion US-Dollars.

¹⁹ Angelika Timm, "Das dritte Drittel. Die DDR und die Wiedergutmachungsforderungen Israels und der Claims Conference," in *Arisierung und Restitution*, ed. Goschler and Lillteicher 216–217.

²⁰ Angelika Timm, *Hammer, Zirkel, Davidstern. Das gestörte Verhältnis der DDR zu Zionismus und Staat Israel* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1997), 93–95.

²¹ Stefan Meinung, *Kommunistische Judenpolitik. Die DDR, die Juden und Israel* (München: Lit, 2002), 247 and 259–262.

started negotiations with the State of Israel in Copenhagen. In February 1990, the GDR's foreign minister, Oskar Fischer, reasoned that it would be "necessary to work out a new position on Jewish material claims."²² The first (and last) freely elected parliament of the GDR adopted in its opening session a declaration asking forgiveness of the people of Israel for the "hypocrisy and hostility of the official GDR policy towards the State of Israel".²³ The last candid efforts by the East German government to achieve an agreement with Israel were brought to a halt by the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990.

The GDR and the Middle-East Conflict

After joining the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the GDR's top priority was to achieve increased international recognition, to which end the SED leadership eyed the Arab hopefully. However, Bonn's Hallstein Doctrine, calling for severing diplomatic relations with any state that fully recognized the GDR, made the Arab states reluctant to do so. Even the establishment in 1965 of full diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel did not affect Arab hesitation to fully recognize the GDR.

An internal document of April 1956 best illustrates the GDR's official position towards Israel.²⁴ According to the document, Zionism had always been supported by the imperialist powers. The sole cause of war in 1948/49 and the "brutal and ruthless expulsion of the Arabs" had been the creation of Israel by "reactionary Zionist circles." Israel had become the "main instrument" of imperialist designs in the Middle East, designs that were detrimental even to the "vital interests of the Israeli people themselves."

During the Suez Crisis of June 1956, East Berlin quickly sided with the Egyptians. However, the SED's policies were seemingly contradictory. For example, it supported Israel's enemies in the Middle East, who were themselves not entirely free of antisemitism, while decrying West Germany as a neo-Nazi state. When Eichmann was put on trial in Israel in 1961,

²² Fischer to Modrow, "Informationen über die Gespräche mit Vertretern Israels," 15 February 1990. SAPMO-BArch, DO/1549, 10–11.

²³ Volksammer der DDR, "Gemeinsame Erklärung der Volkskammer vom 12. April 1990," *Deutschland Archiv* 5 (1990), 794–795.

²⁴ Informationsdienst der Abteilung Agitation des ZK der SED, "Die Rolle Israels als imperialistischer Brückenkopf im Nahen Osten," April 1965. SAPMO-BArch DY/30/IV A 2/9.02/17.

East Berlin sought to use the trial to “show that West Germany today is ruled by Eichmann’s accomplices.”²⁵ At the same time, however, East German agitation claimed a direct link between Adenauer and Ben Gurion. While a “gentlemen’s agreement” between Jerusalem and Bonn to remain silent about ex-Nazis in important West German government positions probably did, in fact, exist,²⁶ East Berlin’s propaganda twist went further, portraying Israel and West Germany as an imperialist Zionist-Nazi coalition oppressing the peoples of the Middle East.

In the 1960s, East Berlin stepped up its diplomatic efforts at wooing the Arab states. Walter Ulbricht’s visit to Egypt in February 1965 was a highlight of these efforts. Disappointingly, however, Ulbricht returned from Cairo not with full diplomatic recognition of the GDR, but merely with a joint declaration condemning “the aggressive plans of Imperialism, for which Israel had been created as a spearhead.”²⁷ When the Six Day War broke out in 1967, East Berlin lost no time in portraying Israel as the sole aggressor. The Ministerial Council of the GDR blamed Israel’s “adventurous policy” for the military clash.²⁸ Media outlets were ordered to show how the “bandog of the USA, West Germany, and Great Britain” had been heavily armed by the imperialistic powers.²⁹ The GDR’s only official national press agency, the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst* (ADN), compiled a documentation that mentioned



1 US emblazes Arab states with a torch named Israel

²⁵ “Argumentation des Büros des Präsidiums des Nationalrats der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschlands, Nr. 28,” 10 June 1960. SAPMO-BArch DY/6/4017.

²⁶ Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, “Adenauer – Ben Gurion – Sharett – Goldmann und die Entwicklung der deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen,” in *Adenauer, Israel und das Judentum*, ed. Hanns Jürgen Küsters (Bonn: Bouvier, 2004), 26.

²⁷ “Dokumente zur Haltung der DDR gegenüber der aggressiven Politik des Staates Israel, zum ökonomisch-militärischen Komplott Bonn-Tel Aviv und zur Palästinafrage,” June 1967. SAPMO-BArch DY/30/IV A 2/9.02/55, 20.

²⁸ “Erklärung des Ministerrats der DDR zur Aggression Israels,” 7 June 1967. Printed in *Neues Deutschland*, 8 June 1967.

²⁹ Werner Lamberz, Presseanweisung “Zur imperialistischen Aggression gegen arabische Staaten,” 5 June 1967. SAPMO-BArch DY/30/IV A 2/9.02/54.



2 „People without space! Blitzkrieg! They have learned this from us, Comrades!“

only Israeli provocations in the run-up to the war and blamed Israel for abusing “the longing of Jews persecuted by Hitler’s Fascism ... for a safe haven.”³⁰

In times of war, the SED’s agitation against Israel always came to the brink of open antisemitism. On 9 June 1967, while fighting raged in the Middle East, Albert Norden, son of a rabbi and for many years the central figure in the SED’s agitation apparatus,

demanding the publication of “all oral and written testimony” proving that Israel was proceeding against the Arab states just like Hitler had against the USSR in June 1941.³¹

The ADN documentation chose its words carefully, speaking of “repeated bloody pogroms” against the Arabs in Israel and accusing Israel of keeping Arabs in “ghettos.”³²

The GDR’S admittance to full UN membership in 1973 did nothing to alter its stance towards Israel. Turning a blind eye to the role played by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in international terrorism, East Berlin broadly supported the PLO, including in the field of paramilitary activities.³³ The GDR actively supported the UN-resolution of 1975 which branded Zionism as a form of racism. It also introduced as official celebrations the “Week of Solidarity with the PLO” and the “Day of Solidarity with the Victims of the Israeli Aggression.”³⁴ Some experts claim that by the 1970s, the GDR had become “the most decisive enemy of Israel in the Socialist world.”³⁵

³⁰ “Zur israelischen Aggression und ihren Hintergründen,” *Neues Deutschland*, 9 June 1967 and *Neue Zeit*, 11 June 1967.

³¹ Norden to Lamberg, 9 June 1967. SAPMO-BArch DY/30/IV A2/2.028/49.

³² “Zur israelischen Aggression und ihren Hintergründen,”

³³ Meinung, *Kommunistische Judenpolitik*, 307–310.

³⁴ Thomas Haury, “»Das ist Völkermord!« Das »antifaschistische Deutschland« im Kampf gegen den »imperialistischen Brückenkopf Israel« und gegen die deutsche Vergangenheit,” in *Exklusive Solidarität. Linker Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Vom Idealismus zur Antiglobalisierungsbewegung*, ed. Matthias Brosch et. al. (Berlin: Metropol-Verl., 2007), 286.

³⁵ Meinung, *Kommunistische Judenpolitik*, 305.

A delegation from East Berlin that visited Israel in November 1980 delivered a devastating report,³⁶ accusing Israeli youth of “fascist tendencies” and behavior towards the Arab characteristic of “Herrenmenschentum.” But by the mid-1980s, the GDR had slightly modified its stance towards Israel. East Berlin hoped to open channels to American-Jewish businessmen. On 9 November 1988, the 50th anniversary of the *Reichspogromnacht*, the GDR opened its archives for selected Israeli scholars from the *Yad Vashem* memorial and research facility. From 29 January to 3 February 1989, East Berlin’s state secretary for religious affairs, Kurt Löffler, visited Israel. Following Löffler’s visit, the first ever by an official representative of the GDR government, the SED decided that steps towards establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel were to be made depending on Israel’s progress toward resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁷

Contacts with the Israeli Communist Party

The only constant dialogue between the GDR and Israel took place between the SED and the Communist Party of Israel. Not surprisingly, this dialogue ran along the lines of a typical exchange between sister parties. When the Communist Party of Israel split into two, with the newly founded *Rakakh* diverging from the *Maki* party, the SED officially remained unbiased. Unofficially, however, the GDR favored the Soviet-dogmatic *Rakakh*.³⁸ There is still much research to be done on relations between the SED and Israeli Communists.

In conclusion, chances for an Israeli-GDR understanding existed until the mid-1950s. With the unresolved issue of indemnification, the general deterioration of Israeli-Communist relations, and the increasing clashes of the two states in global politics, the Israeli-GDR relations over the following decades

³⁶ Egon Winkelman, Otto Funk: Information für das Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der SED. Bericht über den Aufenthalt einer Delegation in Israel vom 05.–15. November 1980. SAPMO-BArch DY/30/11538, Bl. 52–71.

³⁷ “Bericht über den Aufenthalt des Staatssekretärs für Kirchenfragen der DDR, Genossen Kurt Löffler, vom 29.1. bis 3.2.1989 in Israel,” 20 February 1989. SAPMO-BArch, DC/20/I/3/2781, 11–17; “Beschluß des Politbüros des ZK der SED,” 14 February 1989. SAPMO-BArch, DC/20/I/3/2781, 3–6.

³⁸ “Entwurf einer Information an alle Mitglieder und Kandidaten des Politbüros über ein Gespräch des Gen. Paul Markwoski mit Genossen Vilenska und Silber am 24. August 1966,” August 1966. SAPMO-BArch DY/30/IV A 2/20/828, 29–40.

PHOTO CREDITS

1 Junge Welt – Organ des Zentralrats der FDJ, 15 June 1967.

2 Neues Deutschland – Organ des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 7 June 1967.

were characterized by harsh antagonism and occasionally even fierce enmity. The GDR's official line portrayed Zionism and the State of Israel, at times in openly antisemitic terms, first and foremost as instruments of imperialism in the Middle East.

Jakub Tyszkiewicz

The View of Israel in Post-Communist Poland (1989 – 2012)

Since 1989 democratic changes in Poland have radically improved the official view of Israel. This essay will trace how Polish attitudes toward Israel have evolved over twenty years of democracy, and what issues have dominated public discourse.¹ To begin, it should be stressed that from 1967 to 1989 information about Israel was very limited in Poland in no small part because, in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, most Soviet-bloc states broke diplomatic relations with Israel and supported the Arab states.² The Communist-controlled mass media's portrayal of Israel as an "aggressive power" in the Middle East painted a black image of Israel in the minds of Poles and a positive view of "friendly" Arab states, especially Syria and Iraq.

Yet by the 1980s, as political opposition took shape in the Solidarity movement, the state-sponsored anti-Israeli propaganda had become less and less effective. Many Poles had reacted against state opposition to Israel, developing a pro-Israeli stance. Sympathies toward the American ally Israel were encouraged by political opposition circles as a reaction to anti-Israeli Communist propaganda, and many Poles came to appreciate Israel's achievement of having constructed not only a wealthy state out of very few resources, but also the sole democratic state in the Middle East. When in fall 1989, not long after the collapse of the Communist regime, Polish television broadcast on prime time on a Sunday morning the film *Shalom*, a TV

¹ This article focuses on Polish attitudes towards Israel, as opposed to attitudes towards Jews. Sources are limited to verifiable texts – printed and available in the internet – and do not include anonymous online opinions wherein the author and general appeal cannot be ascertained (so-called "internet trolls").

² See for example: Bożena Szaynok, *Poland and Israel 1944–1968. In the Shadow of the Past and of the Soviet Union* (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2012), 406; Monika Kalinowska, "Stosunki polsko-izraelskie po 1967 roku [Relations between Poland and Israel since 1967]," *Marzec '68 z czterdziestoletniej perspektywy*, ed. Danuta Kisielewicz and Małgorzata Świder (Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski, 2008), 280.

documentary made by Israeli television, many Polish viewers watched with great interest.

In February 1990, Poland's new democratically elected government (which included many Solidarity movement leaders) took a major step by re-establishing diplomatic relations with Tel-Aviv.³ Shortly afterwards a new Polish government allowed the transfer of Soviet Jews to Israel via Warsaw's airport. Logistically difficult, not to mention dangerous, the operation allowed about 26,000 Jews from the Soviet Union to emigrate to Israel.⁴

From that time onward, all Polish governments have declared neutrality in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and have stressed both the right of Israel to exist in safe and recognized borders and the need to create a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders.⁵ Even Jewish politicians and mass media have recognized Poland as one of the few countries to refrain from open criticism of Israel. Various Polish governments have stressed the historical ties between Poles and Jews, supported the presence of a sizeable Jewish population in Poland, and initiated commemoration of the Shoah.⁶ The 1991 visit of the legendary Solidarity leader and Polish president Lech Wałęsa to Israel demonstrated the continuing improvement of bilateral relations and prompted a number of initiatives helping to further enhance cooperation between the two countries.⁷ "Israel Days," organized in towns across Poland since 1994, have allowed many Poles to better understand Israel. The Festival of Jewish Culture in Kazimierz (near Cracow), organized in 1998, celebrated the 50th anniversary of the founding of Israel. And since the early 1990s, the Polish-Israeli Friendship Society has played an important role in fostering a positive view of Israel in Poland.⁸

Pope John Paul II played a crucial role in building a positive view of Jews and Israel among Catholics in his native Poland.

³ Ibid., 285.

⁴ Joanna Dyduch, *Stosunki polsko-izraelskie w latach 1990–2009* [Relations between Poland and Israel in 1990–2009] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2009), 44.

⁵ Jacek Stawiski, "Jak godzić ogień z wodą [How to reconcile fire with water]," last accessed 12 November 2012, http://tygodnik.onet.pl/31,0,67221,jak_godzic_ogien_zwoda,artykul.html.

⁶ Ibid. See also Dyduch, *Stosunki polsko-izraelskie*, 43–68.

⁷ Ibid., 49–54.

⁸ Ibid., 221–222.

On the occasion of the Holy Father's visit to Israel in 2000, Israel once more found a positive place in Polish political, religious, and cultural discourse.⁹ Catholics were pleased that the Israeli government had preserved Christian holy sites, and growing numbers of pilgrimages to the Holy Land allowed Polish citizens to see and better understand Jewish history and religion.

Another important shift in Polish perceptions of Israel occurred after the Al-Qaida attack on the World Trade Center in New York City. Since 9/11, Israel has been seen as a close American ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism – a fight in which Polish forces have participated both in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2000 and 2005, post-Communist president Aleksander Kwasniewski visited Israel. In a speech at *Yad Vashem*, he stressed “Polish interest in Poland’s Jewish culture” and “relations between Poland and Israel on many levels.”¹⁰ Even right-wing politicians, such as the late Lech Kaczyński (elected president in 2005), began to see Israel as a bulwark against fanatical Islam.¹¹ A year after his election, Kaczyński visited Israel. Of the many bilateral agreements he signed, one sponsored encounters between Polish and Jewish youth. The 2008 visit of the new Polish prime minister Donald Tusk (from the Liberal Party) further strengthened the relations between the two nations. His visit coincided with the official inauguration of the “Year of Poland” in Israel, the first important cultural event in Israel dealing with Poland.¹² In 2008, Kaczyński declared that Polish leaders unanimously condemned antisemitism and unequivocally supported Israel¹³. This assertion was repeated and strengthened in February 2011 by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. In a statement carried widely by Polish media, he stressed that Poland and Israel had become close partners over the past ten years, and that Israel could rely on Poland’s friendship and solidarity. In Sikorski’s view, Polish solidarity with Israel was spiritually

⁹ See Luiza Arabella Wawrzyńska-Furman, *Judaizm a ekumenizm w świetle nauczania Jana Pawła II* [Judaism and ecumenism in the light of the teaching of John Paul II] (Toruń: Europejskie Centrum Edukacyjne, 2009).

¹⁰ Dyduch, *Stosunki polsko-izraelskie*, 89–90 and 134–135.

¹¹ Stawicki, “Jak godzić ogień z wodą.”

¹² Dyduch, *Stosunki polsko-izraelskie*, 327–328; Kalinowska, “Stosunki,” 286.

¹³ Dyduch, *Stosunki polsko-izraelskie*, 328.

rooted in the trauma of the Holocaust having been carried out by Nazi Germany on Polish soil – against Polish will, but in front of Polish eyes.¹⁴

Nevertheless, since 2009 Israel's policy toward the Palestinians and the separation wall led to disruptions in the positive change in Polish perceptions of Israel. Ironically, criticism has arisen not from the right, but from the left side of the social and political spectrum. The very same Polish press which had previously played such an important role in building a positive view of Israel now criticized Israel's political line. Having first served as the unofficial weekly of the democratic opposition and "Solidarity," the Catholic paper *Tygodnik Powszechny* (*Universal Weekly*), edited in Cracow, in 1987 initiated a lengthy and important discussion about Polish responsibility for the Shoah, thus facilitating the first open scholarly discourse on Polish-Jewish relations during the Nazi occupation of Poland between 1939 and 1945.¹⁵ In an article entitled "Why I'm sailing to Gaza," published in July 2011, a commentator stressed that Israel's policy toward the Gaza strip reminded him of the Nazi imprisonment of Jews in ghettos during World War II. In the polemical left-wing weekly *Polityka*, the world-renowned philosopher Zygmunt Baumann (who had been forced to emigrate from Poland in 1968 amid a communist-led, antisemitic purge) leveled an open critique of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, asserting that Israel's construction of a wall around "occupied territories" was "an effort to outdo those who had ordered [building] the wall around the Warsaw ghetto."¹⁶ Further articles similarly described the Israeli government's treatment of Palestinians as second-class citizens (i.e. the ban on unauthorized well-dig-

¹⁴ Sikorski, "Polska jest krajem filosemickim [Poland is a philosemitic country]," *Bibuła* 28, February 2011, last accessed 14 August 2012, <http://www.bibula.com/?p=33547> (Sikorski's words were printed in the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*).

¹⁵ Jan Błoński, "Biedni Polacy patrzą na getto [Poor Poles Look At Ghetto]," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, No. 2, 11 January 1987, 1.

¹⁶ Gaszenie pożaru ogniem [Extinction of fire by flames] (an interview of Artur Domasławski with profesor Zygmunt Baumann), 16 August 2011, last accessed 12 November 2012, <http://www.polityka.pl/swiat/rozmowy/1518590,1,rozmowa-artura-domoslawskiego-z-prof-zygmuntem-baumannem>. Baumann's statement caused fierce controversy. See for example the text of *Gazeta Wyborcza* journalist Konstanty Gebbert, who described Baumann's words as "vile", last accessed 12 November 2012, <http://www.polityka.pl/swiat/analizy/1518844,1,izrael-i-palestynczycy-polemika-k-geberta-z-prof-baumannem.read>.

ging by Arabs, the expulsion of Bedouins, etc.).¹⁷ Right-wing commentators have gone much further, however, attacking the Polish government's participation in "Israeli-American invasions of sovereign countries," its never-ending "servility" toward Jews and Israel on every issue, and its tacit acceptance of "genocide" in the Gaza Strip.¹⁸ Polish public opinion has also steadily turned against Israeli behavior and come to consider Palestinians as victims of Israeli politics. Nonetheless these tendencies can also be found in other European societies.¹⁹

Jewish accusations concerning the behavior of Poles during the Holocaust and Jewish demands for compensation for plundered and lost property influenced the Polish attitude towards Israel.²⁰ In 2012, a small-town Polish high school planned to invite a Palestinian activist. The ensuing intervention by the Israeli embassy in Poland elicited much criticism among Poles and a negative reaction from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²¹ Recently, the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran has also negatively influenced Polish attitudes towards Israel.

It should be stressed, however, that the perception of Israel in Poland is also influenced by American support of the Israeli government in the Middle East. In recent months, an astonishing manifesto of support for Israel originated from the right wing of the Polish political scene. A far-right wing journalist from the monthly *Frona* stressed that Poland (or Poles, or Catholics) needed to maintain a strategic alliance with the

¹⁷ See for example Magdalena Muhgrabi, "Do ostatniej kropli [Till the last drop]," *Polityka*, 12 December 2008, last accessed 21 February 2013, <http://www.polityka.pl/swiat/analizy/1504498,1,swiatowy-dzien-wody-bez-wody.read>; Artur Domaslawski, "Wygnanie z ziemi obiecanej [An exile from the Promised Land]," *Polityka*, 28 January 2012, last accessed 12 November 2012, <http://www.polityka.pl/swiat/analizy/1523343,1,beduini-z-wyrokiem-na-przesiedlenie.read>.

¹⁸ "Wspólne posiedzenie rządu Polski i Izraela [A common meeting of Polish and Israeli governments]," *bibula* 23.12.2010 r, last accessed 12 November 2012, <http://www.bibula.com/?p=29648>.

¹⁹ Stawicki, "Jak godzić ogień z wodą".

²⁰ Mirosław Kokoszkiewicz, "Gdzie zakotwiczy lotniskowiec USS 'Israel'?" [Where the USS "Israel" is going to anchor?], *bibula* 6.07.2012, last accessed 12 November 2012, <http://www.bibula.com/?p=58439>.

²¹ I LO w Tarnowie: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych uważa za niesłuszną interwencję ambasady Izraela [I LO in Tarnów: Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers intervention of the Israeli Embassy inappropriate], last accessed 12 November 2012, <http://www.tarwizja.pl/index.php/informacje/2990-i-lo-w-tarnowie-ministerstwo-spraw-zagranicznych-uwaza-za-niestosowna-interwencje-ambasady-izraela>.

United States and Israel because these states played a significant and positive role in defending Christian civilization.²² This view of Israel as a strong American bulwark in the Middle East (sometimes sarcastically referred to as the “USS Israel”) reveals abiding changes in perceptions of Israel by groups that until now had sustained a rather reluctant attitude to that country.²³ At the same time, negative views have grown on the left, which used to be sympathetic to Israel.

It is also important to highlight recent non-political activities that have fostered a positive view of Israel in Poland. History books describe the relations between Poland and Israel as beginning immediately after World War II. Notable in this respect are two books on Polish-Israeli relations before 1967. One, by Bożena Szaynok appeared in English in 2012;²⁴ the other, a source book edited by Szymon Rudnicki and Marcos Silber, appeared in both Polish and Hebrew in 2009.²⁵ Israeli history can also be studied in Poland using works by foreign scholars like Colin Shindler, whose work has been translated into Polish,²⁶ and by journalists like Paweł Smoleński, who recently published *Israel Does not Fly any Longer*.²⁷ Also influential is Teresa Torańska's documentary film *Dworzec Gdański* [Gdański Railway Station], in which Polish Jews who had to leave their homeland during the Communist antisemitic purge of 1968 are interviewed. Both this film and a book based on it published in 2008 have played a role in educating Poles about Israeli citizens who still cultivate the Polish language and remember their roots.²⁸

²² “Wywiad z Tomaszem Terlikowskim”, 19 February 2011, last accessed 12 November 2012, <http://fzp.salon24.pl/280017,wywiad-z-tomaszem-p-terlikowskim>.

²³ See for example Jacek Kwieciński, “Izrael – wróg publiczny nr 1? [Is Israel public enemy no 1?],” *Gazeta Polska*, No. 33, 17 August 2011.

²⁴ Szaynok, *Poland and Israel*.

²⁵ *Stosunki polsko-izraelskie (1945–1967). Wybór dokumentów*, ed. Szymon Rudnicki and Marcos Silber (Warszawa: Archiwum Państwowe, 2009). Likewise, in 2010 the young Polish scholar Joanna Dyduch wrote an important analysis of Polish-Israeli relations since 1990 entitled *From Normalization to Strategic Partnership* (Dyduch, *Stosunki*).

²⁶ Colin Shindler, *Historia współczesnego Izraela* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 2011). The English version appeared as *A History of Modern Israel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

²⁷ Paweł Smoleński, *Izrael już nie frunie* (Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne, 2011).

²⁸ Teresa Torańska, *Jesteśmy. Rozstania 68* [We are. Separations 68] (Warszawa: Świat Książki, 2008).

To conclude, there is reason to hope that a positive view of Israel may be nurtured in Poland in the future. As mentioned earlier, a bilateral agreement between Poland and Israel fosters significant growth in the number of organized encounters between Polish and Jewish youth. A particularly valuable educational initiative has been organized by the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw.²⁹ Polish fellows spend three months in Israel to learn about Israel's history, tradition, and culture, as well as about the current social situation there. At the same time, young Israelis come to Poland for a similar purpose. In both cases, young people meet, exchange ideas, and play sports together. There is hope that such initiatives may foster a positive view of Israel in Poland, and vice versa.

²⁹ See *Wymiany studentów z Polski i Izraela* [Exchange of Polish and Israeli students], last accessed 21 February 2013, <http://www.jewishmuseum.org.pl/pl/cms/wymiany-studentow-z-polski-i-izraela/>.

Tamara Or

Israel and Europe: Mapping the Past, Shaping the Future

A Report about the First International Academic Conference of the European Association of Israel Studies (EAIS), held from 10–12 September 2012 at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich

From 10–12 September 2012, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich hosted the First International Academic Conference of the European Association of Israel Studies (EAIS), an organization dedicated to creating a European network of scholars in the field of Israel Studies. Chaired by Professor Michael Brenner (Munich) and Professor Colin Shindler (London), the conference marked the beginning of the EAIS's activities.

Starting Point: Israel Studies in Europe?

What is special about a European Association of Israel Studies, and why do we need one? Since 1985, an international and interdisciplinary network promoting research on modern Israel called the Association of Israel Studies (AIS) has been active. Comprising scholars from diverse fields, the AIS is affiliated with the Middle East Studies Association of North America. The great majority of its members are Americans and Israelis. European scholars, by contrast, are rarely among the speakers at AIS events.

Addressing this disparity, Professor Colin Shindler (London) and Professor Alan Pieckhoff (Paris) examined the scholarly landscape of Israel Studies in Europe. Their findings were and are remarkable. Europe is home to numerous research projects in the field of Israel Studies. Courses in Israel Studies are sponsored by diverse disciplines, including History, Political Science, and Jewish Studies, as well as Economics, Cultural Studies, and Linguistics. Not only the variety of fields, but also the geographic range of institutes involved came as a surprise. From Siberia to the Atlantic, past and present of modern-day Israel are the subject of teaching and research throughout Europe. The poor visibility of Israel Studies in Europe thus

reflects neither a dearth of European scholarship nor, as the conference was to show, the important role in Israel Studies that European scholars can and should play.

The poor visibility of European scholarship in the field of Israel Studies can largely be explained by two factors:

Most European Universities do not treat Israel Studies as a self-sufficient discipline. In Germany, for example, no university maintains a professorship in the field of Israel Studies.

Networking among European scholars pursuing Israel Studies is poor. Whereas Israel Studies are typically interdisciplinary, European scholarship still observes boundaries between individual disciplines. Interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary networking forums are rare.

The founding of the EAIS, therefore, is an important milestone both for Israel Studies in Europe and for European scholarly networks in general. By demonstrating, as Professor Colin Shindler noted in his welcoming address, "what is and will be possible in Europe," the Munich conference sent an important signal.

The Conference

As the conference statistics show, interest in creating networks among European scholars teaching and researching in the field of Israel Studies is intense. One hundred scholars and seventy other participants attended. They hailed from 20 European countries, ranging from Russia to Portugal, as well as from Israel. A few made the journey from the USA. For two days, the Historicum of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität resounded with discussions of current research topics and findings.

The conference opened in the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities with a well attended podium discussion titled "Israel, Palestine, Europe, and the Arab Spring," chaired by Professor Raffaele Del Sarto of the University of Florence. With an audience of around 200 listeners, Professor Munther S. Dajani of Al-Quds University Jerusalem, former Israeli ambassador Avi Primor (1987–1999), and Professor Rita Süsmuth, former Cabinet Minister and President of the Bundestag (1988–1998), discussed strategies for resolving the Middle East conflict. All three speakers raised the issue, in different contexts, of political promises.

For Dajani, the "Arab Spring" – or, in terms he found more fitting, the "Arab Autumn" – has its roots in a promise made

to the younger generation of Arabs, namely that education would enable them to escape social ills such as poverty, a high unemployment, and poor medical care. The promise was broken, dashing hopes of a better future. Foreign aid, including European aid, was not reaching the population. Avi Primor emphasized that Europe could play a central role in resolving the Middle East conflict: Peace is a European interest, and attainable. However, convincing Israeli society that peace is attainable requires addressing the population's increasing security concerns. Therefore, the international community must guarantee peace by means of a political promise of security. Rita Süßmuth pointed out that politicians, if they are to act with foresight, must rely on the work of scholars. She therefore made a case for joint Arab-Jewish academic projects promoting not just good programs, but also "good practice," which could even help eliminate anti-Islamic resentment in Europe.

The following morning, in the *Historicum*, the conference itself, *Israel and Europe. Mapping the Past. Shaping the Future*, began. Twenty-seven panels presented three to five papers each, with four to five panels running simultaneously.

One focus of the conference was on relations between Israel and individual European countries, in particular the post-Soviet states, Poland, Italy, and Germany. Some speakers addressed the transformations within the Jewish communities in Germany following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel. Others considered the future of relations between Israel and various European countries. Michael Wolffsohn (Munich) pointed out that German policy will not support Israel indefinitely, nor unconditionally. From World War Two the two countries drew divergent conclusions. The Jewish state holds to the maxim of never again being a victim, and thus accords the military a prominent place in society. Postwar Germany, by contrast, was built on the doctrine of never again initiating the use of military force. As a result of these historical lessons, Israel and Germany will drift apart politically. As other speakers pointed out, however, countries such as Poland are moving closer to Israel. Alla Zakharenko (Odessa) described how young Israelis traveling to Poland continue to see Poland as the "land of death" and a "Jewish cemetery." In his paper on the post-Communist Polish view of Israel, Jakub Tyskiewicz (Warsaw) presented evidence for a rapprochement of the two states. Based on his examination of Polish mass media, including the Internet, in the last

20 years, he concluded that young Poles have distanced themselves from the Communist portrayal of Israel as an enemy state, developing new sympathies for the State of Israel. Likewise, Dzmitry Shavialiou (Vilna) and Yuval Moshkovitz (London), in their examinations of emigration and remigration of Jewish Israelis to Russia and Great Britain, respectively, demonstrated shifting views on the State of Israel. Both groups of remigrants are defining themselves in “new” ways that unintentionally resemble historical Jewish concepts of Diaspora, such as Dubnow’s autonomism. Secular Jewish Diaspora concepts from the first half of the 20th century also figured in papers by Tamara Or (Berlin) and Aviva Halamish (Tel Aviv). Halamish showed a dialectic influence of Europe on Zionism and Israeli society. On the one hand, a “yearning for Europe” is becoming increasingly noticeable, while on the other hand, the widespread doctrine rejecting Jewish Diaspora existence is alive and well. According to Yair Wallach (London), Israeli society continues to perceive Diaspora nationalism not as an opportunity, but as a threat. Unlike the terms “post-Feminism” and “post-Communism,” “post-Zionism” still bears a negative connotation. Zionism, he argued, should be understood not only as a political project, but also as a category of collective identity construction.

Several papers focused on the topic of identity shaping. How do Israeli and European museums construct ethnic identities? How does Israeli cinema construct identity, and what images of women does it project? How does the lens of literature and theater shape European-Israeli relations? Anat Feinberg (Heidelberg) considered Dan Ben-Amoz’s little-known novel *Masken in Frankfurt*, recalling it, as it were, from oblivion, while Nadjat Abdulhaq discussed how Arab literature portrays Arab Jews.

The peace process in the Middle East, domestic and foreign Israeli policy, Israeli national security—the conference also focused on questions from the realm of political science. Moshe Behar (Manchester) criticized that numerous research projects ignore the fact that West Bank settlement has progressed under both left-wing and right-wing government coalitions. According to several papers on Israeli settlement policy and the role of the military, it is urgently necessary that research into the settler movement be conducted in a non-ideological scholarly context. For Marco Allegra (Lisbon) and Erez Maggor (Jerusalem), for example, the settlements are not self-contained units,

but instead reflect developments in Israeli society as a whole. This is especially true of settlements located near large Israeli cities, settlements which have hardly been studied. In the same session, Johannes Becker (Berlin) argued that the question of Israeli territorial expansion should be examined in connection with and comparison to developments in Arab states such as Syria and Morocco.

Throughout the conference, speakers pointed to the historical, political, and economic importance of Europe and the EU for the past and present of Israel/Palestine. Whereas Ruth Bevan (New York) ascribed to Europe and the EU an insignificant role in future political and economic developments in the Middle East, Shelly Gottfried (London) and Jerzy Wójcik (Krakow) made a case for more EU involvement. Despite being Israel's main foreign trade partner, the EU has never had much political influence. For both Gottfried and Wójcik, Europe's dominance in foreign trade should be put to greater political use in stimulating the peace process. In his review, during the lunch break of the first conference day, of the Israeli European Policy Network's activities over the last decade, Professor Stephan Stetter concurred with this evaluation. Subsequently, in a short speech, former Israeli ambassador Shimon Stein (2001–2007) called upon the EU to decide now whether it wants to be a "player" in the Middle East.

How European is Israel? Does Israel belong to the West or to the East? In a lecture delivered over dinner at the restaurant "Einstein" and titled "West and East: The Politics of Positioning Israel," Ilan Troen (Boston) examined arguments for both positions. On the one hand, institutions in Israel, a OECD member, are largely European in orientation, but on the other hand, Israeli political parties such as Shas maintain an explicitly anti-Western and anti-European profile. Troen emphasized, moreover, how vitally important it is that European universities establish Israel Studies as an independent academic subject, as American universities, albeit belatedly, have already done.

Europe's role for and in Israel will be decided in the future. For the debate about how that future relationship will look, it is certain that we will require non-ideological discussion and scholarly expertise in the field of Israel Studies—not just in America, but also in Europe. Future conferences should continue the discussion in more detail. For example, economics should receive more attention, and new topics such as the di-

dactics of Israel Studies should be addressed. The EAIS's founding conference in Munich illuminated the path toward establishing Israel Studies in Europe. Already now, as the conference made clear, Israel Studies throughout Europe rests on a solid foundation.

Noam Zadoff

"40 Gills of Scotch Whiskey"

A Satirical Birthday Speech from Mandatory Palestine

Jerusalem under the British Mandate was in a way a European city. Situated in the heart of the Levant, the sleepy town underwent striking changes within a short period of time. Existing neighborhoods grew and new ones were established. European urban planning and architecture brought by Jewish immigrants from the continent were increasingly discernible in the city center and the new neighborhoods.

On the social level, Jerusalem was divided into small, secluded groups defined by the national and cultural identities of their members. One such group was a private circle of intellectuals called Pilegish, which used to meet regularly during the 1930s and the 1940s in the neighborhood Rehavia.¹ Most of the participants of this circle were originally from German-speaking countries and had immigrated to Israel as a consequence of their Zionist convictions. Almost all of them were associated with the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The meetings were non-academic and dedicated to discussions of mundane matters in a humorous atmosphere and in the participants' native German tongue.

The members of the Pilegish circle were the Egyptologist Jacob (Hans) Polotsky (1906–1991), the philosopher and researcher of Gnosticism Hans Jonas (1903–1993), the classicist Yochanan (Hans) Lewy (1901–1945), the physicist Shmuel Sambursky (1900–1990), the political scientist George Lichtheim (1912–1973), and last but not least Gershom Scholem (1897–1982), the founder of the academic study of Kabbalah. Scholem stood at the center of the group and was the axis around which the meetings gathered.

¹ For more on the Pilegish circle see Noam Zadoff, "Mit Witz im Ernst und Ernst im Witz: Der Jerusalemer PILEGESCH-Kreis," in *Jüdischer Almanach: Humor*, ed. Giesela Dachs (Jüdischer Verlag: Frankfurt am Main 2004), 50–60; *idem*, "Portretim Bilti Dimyionyim: Hug Pilegish – haverut vesatira ba-universita ha-ivrit," *Cathedra* 126 (2008), 67–82.



1 Members of the Pilegesh circle:
(from left to right)
Yochanan (Hans) Lewy,
Miriam and
Georg Lichtheim,
Jacob Polotsky

Scholem's papers, preserved in the archives of the National Library in Jerusalem, contain much evidence of the meetings of the Pilegesh group, including a poem booklet in German, written by Sambursky, entitled "Nicht imaginäre Portraits." In this collection, members of the circle and their surroundings are portrayed satirically. The poems imitate the style of German poets such as Goethe, Heine, Rilke, and Stefan George; and Gershom Scholem is one of the main protagonists. Another type of document written within the circle consisted of humoristic speeches, composed in Scholem's honor, delivered at parties and celebrations held on special occasions in his life.

The original English text published here was probably read at a meeting of the Pilegesh circle on the occasion of Scholem's fortieth birthday, on 5 December 1937. The author is Jacob Polotsky, who immigrated to Palestine in 1934 after working for the Berlin Academy of Sciences on a German translation of Coptic Manichean papyri. In Jerusalem, Polotsky taught Egyptology at the Hebrew University, where he met the other members of Pilegesh.

The text is a congratulatory letter by an imaginary secretary or official of the British authorities in Palestine in honor of Scholem's birthday. It reflects on the one hand Scholem's central role in the Pilegesh circle and, on the other hand, the way Jewish intellectuals in Palestine perceived the Mandate.

The year 1937 was a crucial one in the history of the British rule over Palestine. In July, more than a year after the outbreak of the big Arab revolt, the Peel Committee recommended a territorial partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs. The last months of 1937 were marked by increasing tension and acts of violence between the three powers present in the land. In this respect, the text presented for the first time here can be regarded as a political satire as well.

[Jacob Polotsky to Gershom Scholem, December 1937. The National Library Jerusalem, Department of Manuscripts and Archives, Gershom Scholem Archive (4°1599), File 16]]

December 1937

Dear Professor Scholem,

As you know, it has become a tradition with H[er] M[ajesty]'s Government to take a cordial interest in your person and to avail themselves of the occasion of important events in your private life to express you their hearty feelings in the form of letters of congratulation. In view of martial law prevailing in this country H[is] E[xcellency] the High Commissioner felt that the task – or rather the pleasure – of composing the present letter, on the occasion of your 40th anniversary [!], should be devolved upon the F.O.C.²

Being an eggs-on-bacon-eating Britisher not familiar with the manners and customs of your race, I applied to a comrade of mine, stationed in Tel Aviv, who has acquired a most remarkable competence in matters relating to Judaism, for a few hints that might be useful for my purpose. The information supplied was to the effect that (i) your family-name means “peace” or “Hallo!” in English; (ii) that you are a professor of Cabbala; (iii) that the number 40 is supposed to be a sort of sacred number.

To begin with your name, I feel somewhat embarrassed to state that my profession prevents me from a wholehearted appreciation of the feelings which the notion of “peace” may be apt to evoke in civilian minds. More serious still is the danger that by the very fact of people walking about with a name like yours, certain inhabitants of this country may be led to misgivings as to the firm determination of H[er] M[ajesty]'s Government to stamp out terrorism. It has, therefore, been found necessary to request you to use your name, as from to-day until further notice, exclusively in its 2nd sense, viz. “Hallo!”, which fortunately has a less direct bearing upon public security.

With regard to your research work I regret to say that I have not been very successful. The word “Cabbala” not being familiar to me – I looked it up in the Concise Oxford Dictionary

² Probably the Foreign Office Commission.

and found the meaning given as "Jewish oral tradition; mystic interpretation, esoteric doctrine, occult lore". I must confess that this is completely Hebrew to me. Yet, you will permit an unsophisticated soldier to remark that "occult lore", whatever that may mean, can hardly be a subject that ought to be taught in a decent University.

Turning now to item (iii), I am glad to announce that my comments thereupon will be of a more pleasant nature. Our first idea was to capture to-day in the hills of Galilee, whence the salvation of the world went forth, the offsprings of Ali Baba's gang and to present them to you for detention in your premises. For technical reasons, however, this idea had to be given up. Instead I undertake herewith to consume this evening in your honour 40 gills of Scotch Whisky, and remain with best wishes

Yours faithfully

...

PHOTO CREDITS

The Israeli National Library
Jerusalem, Department of
Manuscripts and Archives,
Gershom Scholem Archive.

Julia Treindl

Immigration and Emigration: A Student Trip to Israel

What is a kibbutz? Upon our arrival in Israel, everyone in our two courses on Israeli migration knew the answer to this question – or so we thought. Based on socialist and Zionist ideals and dependent mainly on agriculture, kibbutzim are collective communities that play a crucial role in the ideology behind Israel's past and present immigration. Furthermore, kibbutz life is simple, free of superficiality and material luxuries. Yet as we entered Kibbutz Dalia in the Galilee, it occurred to us that we might have misinterpreted something about twenty-first-century kibbutzim. We stayed in cozy, wooden cottages complete with flat screen TVs, Wi-Fi, bathtubs, daily maid service, and a deluxe organic breakfast. There even was a good bar, where we celebrated New Year's Eve along with some of the younger kibbutznikim. This wasn't the only time during our one-week stay in Israel, from 29 December 2012 until 5 January 2013, that we were amazed at how complex, diverse, and at times even paradoxical Israel's present and past appeared.

At Dalia we had the chance to talk to Annette, a German, non-Jewish member who met her kibbutznik husband while journeying around the world. We learned about the crisis of the kibbutzim in the 1980s and their subsequent privatization. Although some elements of traditional kibbutz life, such as educational institutions or collective decision making, still exist, most of the inhabitants now work outside the community and no longer identify with the kibbutz "spirit." In addition, Annette spoke about her initial difficulties in reconciling her new life in Israel with her German identity. For example, she considered not having her children learn any German. Slowly, however, she found a way to deal with her two identities. She translated into German memoirs of kibbutznikim who had survived the Shoah and – much to the joy of many of those older kibbutznikim – even started putting up a Christmas tree.

On our visit to the Museum of Pioneer Agricultural Settlements on the grounds of Kibbutz Yifat, we examined the beginnings of the kibbutzim. Our guide told us what day-to-day life

there had been like, sharing with us old songs as well as jokes about kibbutznik promiscuity. At the early settlement of Zihron Ya'akov, with the grave of Baron Edmond de Rothschild and the Aaronsohn Museum, we traveled even farther back in the history of twentieth-century Palestine.

At the Moshav Kinneret we met Gur Alroy, professor at the University of Haifa. Speaking on the shore of the Sea of Galilee, with the Golan Heights as a backdrop, Alroy focused on a long-neglected chapter of Jewish immigration: the history of the Yemenite Jews. Despite their own lack of farming experience, Zionists of the First and Second Aliyot refused to hire experienced Arab field workers. To provide Jewish labor, Yemenite Jews were brought to Palestine. In terms of wages and living conditions, however, they were not treated as equals. Professor Alroy stressed the important role that research on groups such as the Yemenites can play in deconstructing myths about early Zionism.

Our next stop was Tel Aviv. In the Bauhaus Center we met Gisela Dachs, long-time correspondent for the German weekly *Die Zeit*, who spoke to us about how the integration of French, American, and Russian immigrants into Israeli society is affected by their media consumption. After a "*Bauhaus* tour" (Tel Aviv is home to more *Bauhaus* architecture than any other city in the world), we faced some of the darker aspects of migration. The NGO "Hagar and Miriam – African Israeli Women in Friendship and Motherhood" had arranged for us to speak to a man from the Congo and a young mother from Eritrea. Despite having fled to Israel, these immigrants have not received refugee status. Due to their desperate situation, some immigrants turn to crime, alcoholism, and drugs. By magnifying individual crimes perpetrated by refugees, however, the media facilitates discrimination against African refugees – in politics and in daily life.

In a rather gloomy mood, we made our way to Jerusalem. At the Leo Baeck Institute and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem we had the opportunity to meet some of Israel's most prominent intellectuals. The controversial Moshe Zimmermann spoke about how the memory of the Holocaust serves to create a common Israeli identity. Uzi Rebhun, one of Israel's leading demographers, shared his findings on the current transformation of Israel's population and his prognoses regarding future demographic developments. Historian Yfaat Weiss discussed whether Israel's society should be defined as "multicultural,"

1 Our student group with professor Michael Brenner, Mirjam Zadoff, Noam Zadoff and Gur Alroey (Haifa University).



highlighting several approaches to characterizing the sociopolitical structures in the country.

Intriguing as well as entertaining was an encounter with renowned writer Eli Amir, who spoke to us about the Jews from Iraq. He vividly depicted urban life in Baghdad, the beginnings of Jewish persecution during the 1940s, and the eventual immigration of all Iraqi Jews to Israel. He stressed the Jewish contributions to Iraq's economy, culture, and politics. Like many Iraqi immigrants, Amir himself found the standard of life in newly founded Israel inferior to life in the land of his birth. In his opinion, education was the crucial factor in the success of Iraqi integration into Israeli society. We were intrigued by Amir's charm and his fascinating stories, but also by the way he understood his own identity as that of a Jewish Arab living in Israel.

To explore the unique atmosphere of Jerusalem, we joined an entertaining tour through the "Yekke" neighborhood of Rehavya and the nearby orthodox quarter Nachlaot. We learned about the so-called "Schlafstunde," a daily period of quiet observed by German immigrants, and stumbled upon the colorful book boxes in which orthodox Jews bury religious books. We also spent time in Jerusalem's historic center, discovering the Old City and visiting the Western Wall and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. We haggled in the Souk, indulged in culinary diversity, and tried to grasp Jerusalem's greatness.

The impressive places we visited, the fascinating people we met, and the great discussions we had on this trip will doubtless remain one of our most rewarding experiences as students of history. Our heartfelt thanks go to Michael Brenner and Miriam Zadoff for their great organization and commitment. Without them we might have never found out what a kibbutz really is.

PHOTO CREDITS
1 Privat.

Veronika Nickel, Hannes Pichler, Esther Pütz,
and Josef Prackwieser

„Jerusalem and the Holy Land. Perception and remembrance of Jews and Christians in the Middle Ages“

Impressions from a Fieldtrip to Jerusalem and the North of
Israel with Professor Eva Haverkamp, 18–27 November 2012

In the course of our advanced seminar, under the guidance of Professor Eva Haverkamp, on the different perceptions and memories of medieval Jerusalem among Jews and Christians, 16 participants elaborated on an array of questions concerning Jerusalem's role in Jewish and Christian religious tradition. How was Jerusalem described in pilgrim accounts? How was its holiness reflected in artistic, monumental, and liturgical testimonies? And above all, how did these two groups refer to each other?

On our excursion to Israel, an integral part of the seminar, we were able to address these questions vividly and in detail. We visited Jerusalem, Masada, and the north of Israel. In discussions featuring occasional guest lecturers and, most importantly, eight student presentations, we intensively studied biblical and medieval sources relevant to each destination. Often these discussions went on until late in the night.

On 18 November 2012 we arrived in Tel Aviv. It was the beginning of a journey not just to the medieval crusaders and Mamluks, but also to the First and Second Temple Period, the Hellenistic Era, the Roman occupation, and of course also to modern Israel, with all its vibrant cultural aspects. The large stack of medieval sources which accompanied us – a thick book quickly losing its shape from frequent use – was more than just an essential tool for broadening our knowledge about medieval thought. Writings by Benjamin of Tudela, Felix Fabri, and Obadiah of Bertinoro, Ernoul's chronicle, and many other texts were transformed from printed letters into living, unforgettable guides and companions on our journey through history

On our first day, we visited the Israel Museum, where we plunged into more than 2000 years of the Holy Land's narra-

tive. From manuscripts such as the Dead Sea Scrolls or the Aleppo Codex to archeological exhibits and city models (e.g. the reconstruction of Jerusalem in the Second Temple Period), we were able to study the topography and the settlement strata of Jerusalem, discovering the historical variety and richness of the city. A special exhibition on the past and present of Chassidic Jewry rounded out our visit.

In the afternoon, we visited the Mount Scopus Campus of the Hebrew University. Israel Yuval, director of the Scholion Research Center, and Reuven Amitai, dean of the Faculty of Humanities, gave us a warm welcome and an overview of the development of university studies over the last decades.

In the following days we explored the ancient and medieval sights of Jerusalem. A guided tour through the Western Wall tunnel revealed the monumental size of the Second Temple (of which the present-day wall constitutes a mere fraction) and introduced us to the architecture and its several phases. We visited the excavations at the "City of David," the oldest settled part of the city, descended to the Valley of Kidron and its numerous tombs, and inspected the unique water supply system built by King Hezekiah in the eighth century BCE to bring water from the Gihon spring to the Pool of Siloam. Visits to the holiest places of Christendom, such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Dormition Abbey on Mount Zion, the Via Dolorosa, and the Garden of Gethsemane, showed us once again Jerusalem's importance as a religious city.

One of the highlights of our journey was the massive fortress of Masada. "As the sun rose, we found ourselves immersed in the world of 74 CE and the last days of the Jewish revolt against the Romans. Together with the overwhelming surroundings of the Judean Desert and the Dead Sea, the archeological remains not only evoked autarkic Jewish life on top of the desert hill, but also linked us seamlessly with the historical events. Reading Josephus' *De bello iudaico* and the medieval account of Josippon while wandering along the antique walls of palaces and housing units, we gained an impression of what life must have been like when collective suicide was considered a better choice than being held captive by the Romans." (Hannes Pichler, seminar participant and coauthor of this report.)

The last day of our journey we spent in the north of Israel. The ancient synagogues of Beit Alfa, Sepphoris and Capernaum and the necropolis in the Bet She'arim National Park impressed us with mosaics and relics of medieval Jewish spaces



and contemporary cultural identity. We could, for example, compare different symbolic illustrations of the Temple and the binding of Isaac. Discussing funeral rituals at Bet She'arim made us realize that Jewish communities were deeply influenced by their surroundings. 'I especially enjoyed the wide range of periods covered on our study trip, from the First and Second Temple up to the Middle Ages. Our visit to the excavations of Beit Alfa and Sepphoris was very impressive, particularly because of the interesting explanations by Dr. Shalev-Eyni, art historian at the Hebrew University. Analyzing the mosaics of the two synagogues presented us with the opportunity to discuss the impact of the Jewish-Christian theological dispute on art in the fourth and sixth centuries.' (Sophia Schmitt, seminar participant.)

The beautiful landscape of green plains and mountains framing the Sea of Galilee on our last day in Israel fittingly concluded a week full of impressions and academic input, a week of enrichment not only for our studies, but also for our personal growth.

1 Our student group with Professor Israel Yuval (Hebrew University) and Professor Eva Haverkamp on the Mount Scopus Campus.

PHOTO CREDITS
1 Privat.

NEWSLETTER

Faculty Notes /
Alumni Today

Recent Events

Friends of the Institute

FACULTY NOTES / ALUMNI TODAY

In December **Professor Michael Brenner** was elected a member of the Accademia Nazionale Virgiliana di Science Lettere e Arti in Mantua.

Michael Brenner will take a leave of absence from Munich and teach at American University in Washington, D.C., between fall 2013 and spring 2015 as the first Seymour and Lillian Abensohn Chair in Israel Studies and as director of American University's Center for Israel Studies. He will be replaced during this time by **Professor Alan Steinweis** from the University of Vermont, one of the leading scholars in the field of Holocaust and Jewish Studies. Prof. Steinweis will be introduced in more detail in our next edition.

In the coming spring term the Institute will host two guests from Israel: In April and May, **Prof. emerita Shulamit Volkov** (Tel-Aviv) will teach a few sessions of Professor Brenner's lecture class.

On 8 July Prof. Volkov will also present the Munich History Lecture entitled: 'Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Jüdischen Geschichte.'

In June, **Prof. emerita Itta Shedletzky** (Jerusalem) will teach on Jewish literature, its characteristics and its history during the Nazi period. Prof. Shedletzky will be in Germany as the first Visiting Professor of the newly founded Jakob-Fugger-Zentrum (JFZ) – Research Center for Transnational Studies at Augsburg University.

The Institute congratulates **Professor Yfaat Weiss** on receiving the Hannah Arendt Award for Political Thought. "Through her research," the jury wrote in its decision, "Weiss opens new perspectives for thinking about the coexistence of ethnic groups and minorities in Israel." From 1997 to 1999 Yfaat Weiss was assistant professor at the Institute. Today she is Professor at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Last fall **Dr. Tobias Grill** took up a post-doc position in the new LMU postgraduate program of East and Southeast European Studies. After earning his Ph.D. at the Institute in 2009, Grill worked as assistant professor with Professor Michael Wolffsohn at the University of the Armed Forces. In his new position, funded by the Excellence Initiative, he teaches and researches in the field of Eastern European Jewish History.

In the past winter semester the Institute had three graduates in the field of Modern Jewish History. **Magdalena Wróbel Bloom** earned her Ph.D. with a dissertation on “Cross-Border Social Networks and the Jewish Migration from Poland to Palestine, 1924–1928;” **Oren Osterer’s** dissertation bears the title “Israel in the East German Press;” and **Niels Eggerz** wrote a Master thesis entitled “Moshe Chayim Luzzatto: Perceptions and Self-Perception.” We congratulate all three and wish them all the best.

Katharina Hey, Ph.D. student and research assistant at the Institute, will receive funding from the History Department in the coming summer semester to assist Prof. Noam Zadoff in preparing an application for an Emmy Noether Young Researcher Group award dedicated to “Jewish Intellectuals and the Israeli-Arab Conflict.”

Dr. Anna Menny, who completed her dissertation last year at the Institute, has been working since October 2012 at the Hamburg Institute for the History of the German Jews. She is responsible for a new project created to digitalize and make available online key documents of German-Jewish history.

Dr. Andrea Sinn, lecturer at the Institute, is curating an exhibit on Jewish life in Augsburg at the Jewish Culture Museum Augsburg-Swabia. On 17 April, at 7 pm, the exhibit “Jewish Perspectives in the Land of the Perpetrators? Between

‘Reparations’ and ‘Economic Miracle’ 1950–1969” will open its doors. It runs until 15 September of this year.

Books Published

Last fall marked the publication of the volume *History of the Jews in Germany from 1945 to the Present: Politics, Culture, and Society* (in German), edited by **Michael Brenner**. The authors are Norbert Frei, Constantin Goschler, Dan Diner, Tamar Lewinsky, Atina Grossman, Yfaat Weiss, Lena Gorelik, Anthony Kauders, and Michael Brenner.

Likewise edited by Michael Brenner, in cooperation with **Maximilian Strnad**, is *The Holocaust in German-language Historiography: Review and Perspectives: 12th Dachau Symposia on Contemporary History* (in German). The volume appeared last fall with Wallstein.

In November **Assistant Prof. Mirjam Zadoff’s** dissertation appeared in English with Pennsylvania University Press as *Next Year in Marienbad: The Lost Worlds of Jewish Spa Culture*.

Edited by **Prof. Noam Zadoff**, the correspondence between Gershom Scholem and his student Joseph Weiss, the scholar of Hassidism, appeared last fall in Hebrew (*Gershom Scholem ve-Joseph Weiss. Mikhtawim 1948–1964*. Jerusalem: Carmel 2012). On 6 January the volume was presented to a large audience at the Leo Baeck Institute, Jerusalem. In

addition to the editor, the speakers included Professor Ada Rapoport-Albert (London), Professor Moshe Idel (Jerusalem), and Dr. Oded Irshai (Jerusalem).

Last fall also saw the publication of **Dr. Martina Niedhammer's** dissertation. *Merely "Money Emancipation?" Loyalties and Social Worlds of the Wealthy Jewish Bourgeoisie in Prague 1800–1867* (in German) appeared with Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht as volume two of a series on "Religious Cultures in Modern Europe." On 6 February the book and the newly founded series were presented to the public in the Historisches Kolleg. The work received the 2013 Georg R. Schroubek Dissertation Prize. Our warmest congratulations go to Dr. Niedhammer.

RECENT EVENTS

On 21 October 2012 a large crowd attended the **book presentation**, hosted by



Norbert Frei, Rachel Salamander, Michael Brenner, Ellen Presser (left to right).

the Jewish Community of Munich, of *History of the Jews in Germany from 1945 to the Present*. Professor Michael Brenner, Professor Norbert Frei (Jena), Dr. Rachel Salamander, and the director of the Cultural Center of the Jewish Community discussed how Jewish life in Germany has developed since 1945.

For the third **Yerushalmi Lecture**, on 12 December 2012, we welcomed from Jerusalem **Prof. Steven Aschheim**, who spoke about "Zionism and Europe."

On January 15 the inaugural lectures of **Allianz Visiting Professors Tülay Artan** (Istanbul) and **Aron Rodrigue** (Stanford) took place. Professor Artan, whose guest professorship is affiliated with the Institute for the Near and Middle East, spoke about "The Privy Chamber of Ahmed III and the Celestial Lights in Praise of the Best of Creation." The lecture of Professor Rodrigue, guest professor at the Institute of Jewish History and Culture, was titled "From Ottoman Empire to Greece: The Jews of Salonica 1912–1913." **Professor Bernd Huber**, president of the LMU, and **Professor Wolfgang Ischinger**, chief representative of the Allianz SE for government relations and former German ambassador to the USA, delivered welcoming addresses.

On 29 January **Allianz Visiting Professor Aron Rodrigue** gave the annual lecture of the Foundation for Jewish History and Culture, at the Jewish Community Center of Munich, on "The Is-



Italian consul general Filippo Scammacca del Murgio, Michael Brenner, Aron Rodrigue, Greek consul general Sofia Grammata, and Nikolaj G. Kiessling of the Foundation for Jewish History and Culture (left to right).

land of Roses: Rhodes, the Holocaust and Sephardi Memory.” Welcoming remarks came from the consul general of Greece, **Sofia Grammata**, and the consul general of Italy, **Filippo Scammacca del Murgio**.

One day after the Israeli elections, the Institute of Jewish History and Culture hosted Israeli consul general **Tibor Shalev-Schlosser** for a discussion with students and the Friends of the Institute about “Israel after the Elections.” The consul general elucidated the concerns of Israelis before the elections and offered preliminary thoughts on the implications of the election results.



Israeli consul general Tibor Shalev-Schlosser

Save the Date

April 24

Professor Paula Fass (Berkeley): “Children of the Holocaust: Some Personal Reflections”



The daughter of two victims of the Shoah

who spent years in the Lodz Ghetto, and then in various concentrations camps, Paula Fass was the child of a second family formed after the war in Hannover. After years as a professor of history at Berkeley, she felt impelled to write about this ‘historical’ experience. In *Inheriting the Holocaust* she puts her memory and her skills as a researcher to the test as a historian and as a daughter, seeking to find out more about her parents past and trying to find the basis for her own need to become a historian. Paula Fass will reflect on this process of writing as a member of the second generation.

Paula S. Fass is the Margaret Byrne Professor of History at the University of California at Berkeley, where she has taught for the past thirty-six years. Since 2010, she has also been Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Rutgers University, New Brunswick. Trained as a social and cultural historian of the United States at Columbia University, she has over the last decade been active in developing the field of children’s history and worked to make this an interdisciplinary field with a global perspective. She was the President of the Society of the

History of Children and Youth, which she helped to found, from 2007–2009. The author of *Children of a New World: Society, Culture, and Globalization* (2007) and many other books, she is a member of the American Philosophical Society, and has an honorary Doctor of Philosophy Degree from Linköping University in Sweden.

In cooperation with the Center of Advanced Studies at LMU.

May 16

Nicholas Stavroulakis (Hania/Crete): “Etz Hayyim: Destruction and Reconstruction of a Synagogue on Crete”



Nicholas Stavroulakis was educated in the United Kingdom and the United States (University of Michigan) and did his postgraduate work for his doctorate at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He was instrumental in creating a number of university programs in Greece, Italy, and Turkey and lectures frequently in Byzantine and Ottoman history and art. He founded and was director of the Jewish Museum of Greece in Athens from 1973 until 1994. He established the new Jewish Museum of Thessaloniki and was its curatorial advisor from 1997 until 2005. In 1995 he undertook the restoration of the Etz Hayyim Synagogue in Hania/Crete. In this lecture he will tell about the reconstruction of the only synagogue in Crete today and its history.

In cooperation with the Consulate General of Greece and the Friends of the Institute of Jewish History and Culture.

June 13

Prof. Derek Penslar (Oxford/Toronto): “How Jews Became Israelis”



Throughout most of its history Zionism has been as much a revolutionary

movement as a national one. The Zionist revolution was part of the great transformative movements of the twentieth century yet had distinct features. It sought to transform the Jews from a people always on the move to one rooted in their ancient homeland, from a nation of merchants to one of farmers and laborers; from a multi-lingual civilization into a new Hebraic one; from timid Jacob to a brave and militant David. This lecture tells the story of the Zionist revolution, its fulfillment in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the mass immigration of the 1950s, and its gradual decline ever since.

Derek Penslar is Stanley Lewis Professor of Israel Studies at the University of Oxford and holds the Samuel J. Zacks Chair in Jewish History at the University of Toronto. He is one of the leading experts on the history of Zionism and Israel. In 2011 he was made a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. Among his books are *Zionism and Technocracy: The Engi-*

neering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870–1918 (1991), *Shylock's Children: Economics and Jewish Identity in Modern Europe* (2001), *Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective* (2006), and most recently *The Origins of Israel 1882–1948: A Documentary History* (2011).

In cooperation with the LMU Institute of History of Science.

June 18

This year's **Scholem Aleichem Lecture**, "Yiddishists vs. Hebraists: The Language Feud in East European Jewry" (in Yiddish), will be delivered by **David**



Fishman, professor of Jewish History at The Jewish Theological Seminary in New York.

At the turn of the 20th century, East European Jews were engulfed in an intense ideological battle over the question of language. Which language should be the medium for Jewish literature, scholarship, and communal life: Hebrew, Yiddish, or Russian? While hard-core Zionists were "Hebraists" and adherents of the Jewish socialist Bund were "Yiddishists," many Jewish intellectuals argued for bilingualism and even tri-lingualism in Jewish life. The landmark event in this debate was the 1908 Czernowitz conference for the Yiddish language, which declared Yiddish a Jewish national language – an act that provoked

great controversy. After Czernowitz, the Hebrew national poet H.N. Bialik ceased writing in Yiddish, and the Yiddish classic I.L. Peretz no longer wrote in Hebrew. We will explore this debate and consider its long-term consequences.

Professor Fishman is the author of numerous books and articles on the history and culture of East European Jewry. His books include *Russia's First Modern Jews* and *The Rise of Modern Yiddish Culture*. He directs the Jewish Archival Survey of the Project Judaica in Moscow, which publishes guides to Jewish archival materials in the former Soviet Union. In cooperation with the Cultural Center of the Jewish Community of Munich.

June 20–21, 2013

International Conference:

Jews and Muslims in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Historisches Kolleg, Munich

Preliminary Program

Michael Brenner and **Martin Schulze Wessel** (LMU, Munich): Opening remarks

Michael Stanislawski (Columbia University, New York): The Jewish and Muslim Enlightenments: A Comparison

Yochanan Petrovsky-Shtern (Northwestern University, Evanston): Major trends in the most recent historiography covering Muslims and Jews in Russia and the Soviet Union

Panel I:

Jews and Muslims and their encounter with the Imperial and Soviet States

Kelly O'Neill (Harvard University, Cambridge): Islamic endowments and the re-making of Crimean Lands

Vladimir Levin (Hebrew University, Jerusalem): Common Problems, different solutions. Jewish and Muslims Politics in late Imperial Russia

Franziska Davies (LMU, Munich): Jews and Muslims as soldiers of the Tsar: The army and the challenge of difference

David Schick (LMU, Munich): The Jews in the economic policy of the Russian Empire: The example of Odessa (1855–1894)

Panel II:
The making of national and confessional identities

Ellie Schainker (Emory University, Atlanta): A view of the Confessional State from Below: Converts from Judaism and Confessional Choice in Nineteenth-Century Imperial Russia

Michael Khodarkovsky (Loyola University, Chicago): Islamic identity in late Imperial Russia

David E. Fishman (Jewish Theological Seminary, New York): Yiddish and the Formation of a Secular Jewish National identity in Czarist Russia

Adeeb Khalid (Carleton College, Minnesota): From Muslim Anticlericalism to Soviet Atheism: The Uzbek intelligentsia through the Revolution, 1917–1929

Panel III:
Depicting difference. Visual and discursive representations of Jews and Muslims in late imperial Russia and the early Soviet Union

Vladimir Bobrovnikov (Institute for Oriental Studies, Moscow): Constructing Religious Minorities in the Russian Caucasus, 1860s-1920s: "Aliens" Clergy and Congregations of Dagestani "Native" Muslims and Jews

Yvonne Kleinmann (University of Leipzig): The Power of Documentation: Ethnographic Representations of Jews and Muslims in the late Russian Empire

Stefan Wiese (Humboldt University, Berlin): Jews and Muslims in the Pogrom Narratives of 1905

David Shneer (University of Colorado, Boulder): Photographing the New Soviet Jew

June 27

Yochanan Petrovsky-Shtern (Northwestern University): "Lenin's Jewish Question"

Why have Russian racists attempted to portray Lenin as a

Jew, and why did Lenin approach the Jewish question as he did? In his presentation, Yochanan Petrovsky-Shtern will examine Lenin's controversial background, in particular the now-documented fact that Lenin had a maternal Jewish great-grandfather named Moshko Blank. The newest archival discoveries about Moshko Blank and Blank's conversion to Christianity shed light on a tantalizing question: why Soviet Communists sought to suppress any discussion of Lenin's Jewishness. Explore the fate of Jews in the Russian empire and the USSR through the prism of the posthumous fate of Lenin's great-grandfather.

Yochanan Petrovsky-Shtern is the Crown Family Professor of Jewish Studies and a Professor of Jewish History. He holds a Ph.D. in Modern Jewish History from Brandeis University (2001) and a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from Moscow University (1988). He has received several grants and awards and has been visiting professor at multiple institutions in Israel, USA, and Europe. He has been appointed a Fulbright Specialist on Eastern Europe; a Fellow at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute; and a Visiting Professor at the Free



Ukrainian University in Munich. He has published several books, including *Jews in the Russian Army, 1827–1917: Drafted into Modernity* (2008); *The Anti-Imperial Choice* (2009, winner of the *American Association of Ukrainian Studies* book award); and *Lenin's Jewish Question* (2010). He has finished a new book, *The Golden-Age Shtetl*, and together with his colleague Dean Bell is working on a documentary history of the Jews in early Modern World, 1450–1750.

In cooperation with the European Janusz Korczak Academy.

July 17

Leora Batnitzky
(Princeton): “How
Judaism Became a
Religion”



Whether religion is a private matter or public concern is a central question for faith traditions in today's world. But this question is older than it may seem from contemporary debates. This lecture suggests that the question of religion's private or public status has driven modern Jewish thought since the eighteenth century. Ever since the Enlightenment, Jewish thinkers have debated whether and how Judaism – largely a religion of practice and public adherence to law — can fit into a modern, Protestant conception of religion as an individual and private matter of belief or faith. The clash between the modern category of religion

and Judaism is responsible for much of the tension in modern Jewish thought and also offers an important case study of the relationship between religion, politics, and the modern nation state.

Leora Batnitzky is Professor and Chair in the Department at Princeton University, where she also directs Princeton's Tikvah Project on Jewish Thought. She is the author of three books: *Idolatry and Representation: The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig Reconsidered* (Princeton 2000); *Leo Strauss and Emmanuel Levinas: Philosophy and the Politics of Revelation* (Cambridge 2006); and *How Judaism Became a Religion: An Introduction to Modern Jewish Thought* (Princeton, 2011); as well as numerous articles and book chapters. Her current research focuses on historical and philosophical intersections between modern legal theory (analytic and continental) and modern religious thought (Jewish and Christian).

In cooperation with the International Research Group “Religious Cultures in 19th and 20th Century Europe.”

In the field of Medieval Jewish history the Institute will host the following guests in the summer of 2013: **Prof. Ivan Marcus** (Yale University), **Prof. Sarah Stroumsa** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) und **Prof. Shmuel Shepkaro** (University of Oklahoma).

“For Things Have No Memory... Material Tradition and Jewish Memory” – In 2013 the Institute, in cooperation with

the Jewish Museum Hohenems and Universities Basel, Salzburg, Vienna, and Zurich, is again organizing the **European Summer University for Jewish Studies** in Hohenems. How are knowledge, traditions, and a sense of meaning passed down through the generations? What role does material tradition play in a diaspora culture marked by mobility, transnationalism, and violent historical ruptures? How do objects become bearers of narrative? Who preserves them and how are they interpreted? How are they passed on, forgotten, preserved, and rediscovered? From 21 to 26 July summer university participants will delve into these and other topics. Everyday objects and ritual paraphernalia, books, letters, photographs, tombstones, and memorabilia – all these things have a history in which individual and collective experiences, self-perceptions and relationships run together. The physical form of memory represents both a historical trail and ideational construction. Whether dealing with family heirlooms and sentimental souvenirs, institutions such as museums, libraries, and archives historical images, or the interpretive performance of the historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious sciences, we are constantly confronted by images of history and formulations of identity.

PROGRAM

July 21

Erik Petry (Basel): Collective Jewish memory – and why it may not exist

Alfred Bodenheimer (Basel): Remember what Amalek did unto thee! On Jewish forgetting

Aleida Assmann (Konstanz): Do things have memory?

July 22

Mirjam Zadoff (Munich): Aryanization of everyday life, or Why things have no memory

Tamar Lewinsky (Basel): The Jewish tradition of compilation and research in Eastern Europe (Dubnow, Anski, and the aftermath)

Klaus Davidowicz (Vienna): Loss of things and the transformation of the Jewish experience in popular cinema

Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (New York/Warsaw): The Jewish Museum in Warsaw

July 23

Tamar El-Or (Jerusalem/Zurich): Endurance of forms and the emergence of style in Israel

Stefan Schreiner (Tübingen): Vilna's Jewish Libraries

Armin Eidherr (Salzburg): Books, Images, Lights – Objects and Memory and Stefan Zweig: The Jewish cultural-historical point of view

July 24

Felicitas Heimann-Jelinek (Vienna): Judaica – Introduction to the narrative of objects

Eva Haverkamp (Munich): Medieval manuscripts

Daniela Schmid (Vienna): Objects of Superstition – Jewish amulets past and present

Emile Schrijver (Amsterdam): Written traces: Genisoth, fragments, and other forms of tradition

July 25

Albert Lichtblau (Salzburg): Grasping memory: The power of the material

Deborah Jacobs (Basel): Representation and the use of images in Judaism

Joachim Schloer (Southampton): To take and/or to leave: things and emigration

26. July

Hanno Loewy: Ambiguity of objects in museum contexts

Rabbi Michel Bollag: Parashat haShawua
The following courses will meet daily:

Sabina Bossert (Basel): Judaica for beginners

Felicitas Heimann-Jelinek (Vienna): Advanced Judaica

Michael Studemund-Halevy (Hamburg): Tombstones

Ittai Tamari (Munich): Manuscripts

Additional information can be found at the Institute homepage and via Summer University coordinator **Evita Wiecki M.A.** (evita.wiecki@lrz.uni-muenchen.de).

FRIENDS OF THE INSTITUTE

Annual Meeting

The annual meeting of the Friends of the Institute took place on 29 January in the media room of the Jewish Community Center.

The meeting was led by the new chairman of the Friends, Professor Klaus Schultz. Board members Dr. Andrea Sinn und Dr. Ernst-Peter Wieckenberg were also in attendance. The usual agenda of items was discussed, with the focus on Hans Theismann's report on the balance of accounts and the auditor's report by Hans Dieter Schell. Both reports were, as in the previous years, very favorable; the precise work of the new treasurer, Andrea Sinn, was roundly praised. The members in attendance unanimously relieved the board of liability for the past year, with the board members abstaining. In the coming year, recruiting new members will remain a goal to be pursued actively.

Professor Michael Brenner und Professor Eva Haverkamp reported on program highlights of the past year and gave a preview of plans for the coming year.

Klaus Schultz offered to organize, towards the end of the coming summer semester, an additional evening for the Friends in which he and Jens Malte Fischer would speak about "Richard Wagner and the contradictions of his character as an artist and social actor." The idea was warmly received. The Friends will be informed in advance of

the proposed evening, which is tentatively planned for mid-July.

The annual meeting continued with the presentation of the three new **Ulpan Scholarship recipients**: the *Leon and Lola Teicher Scholarship*, established by Dr. Eli, Samy, and Maximilan Teicher, went to **Laura Sophie Stadler**; the *Günther Anders Scholarship*, established by Dr. Wolfgang Beck, went to **Sophia Schmitt**; recipient of the *Gerald D. Feldman Scholarship*, established by the Friends of the Institute, was **Cinderella Petz**.

The **Max and Fila Gonsenheimer Scholarship for Study in Israel**, established this year by Ron Jakubowicz, went to **Katharina Hey**, doctoral student at the Institute.

In conclusion, Assistant Professor Mirjam Zadoff presented to the authors of the six best term papers in 2012 book prizes sponsored by the Friends. **Lily Maier** wrote about "Self-perception and Identity in Oneg Shabbat: Political, Religious, and Ideological Background" for the course "The Holocaust – the Shoah: History – Perspectives – Images" (Mirjam Zadoff). **Franziska Sonner** examined in her paper the topic "Political Zionism – From a Visionary's Dream to Reality?" in the course "West Meets East, East Meets West: Interaction between Jews in the Occident and Jews in the Orient" (Julie Grimmeisen). **Tonio Weicker** dealt with "Israel As Melting Pot: Mosaic or Hybrid Society? An Analysis of

Transformative Processes in Israeli Society As Seen in the Russian-Jewish Immigration Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union” in the course “Israel: Society, Culture, and Politics” (Noam Zadoff). **Sören Heitkamp** wrote his paper on “Tendencies of Israeli Society As Seen through Ari Folman’s *Waltz with Bashir* and Joseph Cedar’s *Beaufort*” in the course “Writing about One’s Self: Autobiographies and Source Texts of Modern Jewish History” (Mirjam Zadoff). Written for the course “With God, Kaiser, and Bundeskanzler: Jews in the Danube Monarchy and Both Austrian Republics”

(Mirjam Zadoff) **Liza Soutschek**’s paper bore the title “Between Past and Future – Life in Austria’s Jewish DP Camps. **Christina Stangl** wrote about “The Message of the Jewish Story of Amram and the Question As to Whether It Was Borrowed from the Christian Emmeram Legend” in the course “Jews in the Medieval Cities on the Rhine and the Danube” (Eva Haverkamp).

K. S.

Authors

Azriel Bermant

was awarded his PhD from University College London in January 2012. Between 1998 and 2006, Bermant worked as a writer, editor, and translator for the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. He is now a research associate in the field of Arms Control at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University.

Samuel Ghiles-Meilhac

earned his PhD in sociology at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris. He wrote his dissertation on the Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France (CRIF), the Jewish political umbrella organization. He teaches at the Institute of Political Sciences in Paris and Lille and is the author of *Le CRIF 1943 à nos jours: De la Résistance juive à la tentation du lobby* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2011).

Rory Miller

is Director of Middle East & Mediterranean Studies at King's College London. His most recent book, *Inglorious Disarray: Europe, Israel and the Palestinians since 1967*, was published in 2011.

Oren Osterer

studied Media and Politics at Bonn University. In October 2012 he submitted his dissertation on "Israel's image in newspapers of the GDR" at Munich University.

Colin Shindler

is professor emeritus at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His book *Israel and the European Left* was published by Bloomsbury last year.

Jakub Tyszkiewicz

is professor at the University of Wrocław, Poland, and was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago (1997), the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (2007–2009) and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2011). Recently he coauthored *Historia Powszechna. Wiek XX* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2010) and *Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Polski w dobie prezydentury Johna F. Kennedy'ego* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2011).

Noam Zadoff

holds the Ben Gurion Guest Chair for Israel and Near-Eastern Studies at the University of Heidelberg and the Hochschule für Jüdische Studien Heidelberg. He is the editor of *Gershom Scholem and Joseph Weiss: Correspondence 1948–1964* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2012). His book *From Berlin to Jerusalem and Back: Gershom Scholem between Israel and Germany* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Carmel) is forthcoming.

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Geschichte und Kultur)

Overview of past issues
(titles translated from German)

1/2007

Yfaat Weiss on Lea Goldberg –
Jews in Postwar Germany

2/2007

The Historical Figure of Gershom Scholem –
Jürgen Habermas, David A. Rees, Itta Shedletzky,
Lina Barouch, Mirjam Triendl-Zadoff, Noam Zadoff,
and Giulio Busi

1/2008

Munich Portraits: Three Jewish Biographies –
Christian Ude on Kurt Eisner,
Hans-Jochen Vogel on Lion Feuchtwanger,
Rachel Salamander on Gerty Spies

2/2008

Judaism and Islam –
John M. Efron, Richard I. Cohen,
and Carlos Fraenkel

1/2009

Germany in Israel / Israel in Germany –
Dan Laor, Anja Siegemund, Christian Kraft, Andrea Livnat,
Gisela Dachs, Chaim Be'er, and Julie Grimmeisen

2/2009

The Portative Fatherland — Hans Magnus Enzensberger,
Rahel E. Feilchenfeldt, Andreas B. Kilcher, Michael Krüger,
Thomas Meyer, David B. Ruderman, Ittai J. Tamari,
Ernst-Peter Wieckenberg, and Reinhard Wittmann

1/2010

A German-Jewish Post-War Geography –
Tobias Freimüller, Katharina Friedla, Anne Gemeinhardt,
Monika Halbinger, Tamar Lewinsky, Hendrik Niether,
Andrea Sinn, and Maximilian Strnad

2/2010

From *Kristallnacht* to November Pogrom: Transformations in
Commemorating 9 November 1938 – Norbert Frei,
Anne Giebel, Constantin Goschler, Monika Halbinger,
Harald Schmid, and Alan E. Steinweis

1/2011

Perceptions of Self and Other: Scholarship on Ancient and
Medieval Judaism – Ismar Schorsch, Ora Limor und
Israel J. Yuval, Kenneth Stow, Astrid Riedler-Pohlens,
and Wiebke Rasumny

2/2011

The New Sefarad: Modern Spain and Its Jewish Heritage –
David Nirenberg, Michael Studemund-Halévy,
Michal Friedman, Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, Anna Menny,
Carlos Collado Seidel, and Alejandro Baer

1/2012

Jewish Voices in the Discourse of the Sixties –
an Elmau Symposium – Awi Blumenfeld, Michael Brenner,
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Dan Diner, Norbert Frei,
Jürgen Habermas, and Rachel Salamander

2/2012

Munich – City of Art? Interrupted Lives –
Willibald Sauerländer, Sandra Steinleitner, Olena Balun,
Anna Messner, Winfried Nerdinger, Eva-Maria Troelenberg,
Annette Hagedorn, Heidi Thiede, and Lisa Christina Kolb